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MOBILIZATION FOR DEVELOPMENT

By the early 1980s, the rapid industrialization of Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong had transformed East Asia into a global economic hub. The region's success inspired a large body of research on the developmental state, a regime-centered theory of industrialization pioneered by Chalmers Johnson in 1982. To briefly summarize the theoretical model, developmental states tend to exhibit the following characteristics: state autonomy from social forces, strong state institutions, an elite technocratic bureaucracy, the prioritization of economic development over other goals, a modernization ideology that calls for significant state intervention in the market, and a state-corporatist relationship with the private sector.[1] In spite of some criticisms of the theory, over three decades later it remains the dominant framework for comparing East Asian countries in political science and has been applied more broadly to the case of China and other emerging economies.[2]

Considering the size of the developmental state literature, it is surprising just how little attention has been paid to the issue of rural development. Most accounts assume that East Asia conformed to W. Arthur Lewis's dual-sector model in which agriculture's contribution to

[1] This summary was mostly informed by my reading of Johnson 1982 and Wade 2004.
[2] Criticisms of the model have centered on its limited applicability to other developing countries, its misrepresentation as free market capitalism, and its apparent failure in the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis; see Pempel 1999; Stiglitz and Yusuf 2001. For recent work on the developmental state in China, see Knight 2014. On South Africa, see Edigheji 2010.

industrialization is basically limited to the supply of surplus labor. As Lewis explained in his seminal 1954 essay, for countries with large rural populations, the reallocation of labor from agriculture to industry fuels rapid growth because the deep pool of excess labor ensures that wages remain low. However, the eventual exhaustion of surplus labor, a milestone known as the "Lewis turning point," leads to rising wages, labor shortages and slower growth, thereby necessitating economic rebalancing away from manufacturing and exports toward services and consumption. Most economists believe Japan, Taiwan and Korea reached this point in the 1960s-1970s, and China will reach this point soon.[3] The model implies that agriculture is stagnant and backward, and that the trickle-down effect of industrialization is what paves the way for rural development. While several scholars have challenged Lewis's ideas, the developmental state literature still tends to either ignore the rural sector because of its minimal role in industrialization, or to focus on land reform as the region's most important and successful rural policy.[4]

The rural side of East Asia's economic transformation is therefore under-theorized, which is unfortunate given the region's impressive achievements. After World War II, agricultural production quickly returned to, and then surpassed, prewar peak levels, as early as 1950 in Japan, 1951 in Taiwan, and 1954 in South Korea (following the Korean War). Even during the "economic miracle" period of 1955-1970 in Japan, when industrialization pushed GNP growth into double digits, agriculture's performance remained strong, averaging 3 percent per year.[5] In Taiwan, agriculture experienced a 15-year stretch of accelerated growth, averaging 4.6 percent

[3] Minami and Ma 2010.
[4] For a broad discussion of the Lewis model and its critics, see Ranis 2004. For a similar critique of the developmental state literature and an example of scholarship that stresses land reform, see Kay 2002.
[5] Francks 1999, 38.

per year from 1952 to 1967. It then transitioned into a phase of deceleration, but nonetheless maintained an impressive growth rate of 3.2 percent throughout the 1970s.[6] South Korea followed a similar pattern as Taiwan, with agricultural production growing 3.5 percent per year from 1954 to 1973, and then slowing down in the 1970s.[7]

Comparing East Asia with the rest of the world reveals just how exceptional this performance was. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the global average annual growth rate for agriculture during the 1952-1971 period was 2.7 percent, lower than all of the averages just reported.[8] Looking only at crop yields (not total sector production), East Asia and the Pacific registered 2.7 percent annual growth for the 1961-1975 period, compared with 1 percent for Latin America and the Caribbean, .8 percent for the Middle East and North Africa, 1.7 percent for South Asia, and 1.3 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa.[9]

One theme that emerges from previous studies by economic historians is the importance of institutions. Owing to the legacy of Japanese colonialism and U.S.-backed land reforms, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan shared similar institutional features—(1) a smallholder farm economy dominated by owner-cultivators with secure private property rights to land; (2) effective rural extension systems maintained by a technocratic bureaucracy and parastatal farmers' organizations; and (3) extensive state control over agriculture, especially with regards to the production of rice and staple foods. This combination of institutions was powerful. It led to widely dispersed, long-term gains in agricultural production, enabled the back-and-forth transfer of resources between the industrial and agricultural sectors, and mitigated against rural policy

[6] Yager 1988, 51-2.
[7] Ban et al. 1980, 35-9.
[8] Ban et al. 1980, 16.
[9] Wik et al. 2008, 20.

decisions that were purely extractive.[10] In contrast, many poor countries in the developing world have extremely weak and unequal extension services, with crucial inputs being directed toward large farmers tasked with producing cheap food for the state.[11] Gains in production are more random than systematic. And the state lacks both the capacity to transfer resources between sectors and the political will to support broad-based rural development.

These convergences suggest that there is indeed an East Asian model of rural development. However, in this paper I depart from the existing literature to focus on the phenomenon of rural modernization campaigns and their impact on other dimensions of development besides production. Technocratic governance and careful economic planning are key features of the developmental state model, yet shifting the focus from industrial policy to rural policy reveals a different type of politics. To borrow Weber's (1958) terminology, campaigns are a manifestation of charismatic authority, and institutions are rooted in bureaucratic or legal authority. These modes of politics are distinct but not mutually exclusive: the same technocrats who follow administrative routines can also be revolutionaries who serve as a conduit for campaigns. Whereas most scholars dismiss the region's campaigns as illiberal and misguided deviations from a more successful, technocratic approach to development, I argue that they had a major impact, especially in terms of changing the village environment, and that variation in development outcomes may be explained by the interaction of campaigns and institutions. Looking at this dynamic, rather than institutions alone, provides a more complete understanding of how rural development occurred in East Asia.

The paper is organized as follows. Part one discusses the concept of campaigns. Part two presents a case study of Taiwan to illustrate the conditions under which campaigns are more

[10] These points can be found in Francks 1999; Ho 1978.
[11] Bates 1981.

likely to facilitate rural development. The final section provides an overview of a few other cases to show that this strategy of mobilization for development was common throughout the East Asia and that it did not always result in positive outcomes.

I. RURAL MODERNIZATION CAMPAIGNS

State campaigns are policies that demand high levels of mobilization to achieve dramatic change. In terms of content, campaigns may have broad or specific goals, but in general they are transformative policies that are often dressed up in revolutionary language. They also employ mobilization—efforts to activate and involve a population in pursuit of certain goals—as the dominant mode of policy implementation.[12] While the extent of popular or mass mobilization varies significantly based on campaign goals and targets, bureaucratic mobilization is a central feature of all campaigns. This type of politics has long captured the attention of scholars such as Robert Tucker, who put forward the idea of movement regimes to describe communism in the Soviet Union, fascism in Europe, and nationalist revolutionary movements in Asia, Africa and other parts of the post-colonial world.[13] State-sponsored mobilization is also a defining characteristic of totalitarian regimes. As Juan Linz explains: "Citizen participation in and active mobilization for political and collective social tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded, and channeled through a single party and many monopolistic secondary groups. Passive obedience and apathy, retreat into the role of 'parochials' and 'subjects,' characteristic of many

[12] My understanding of campaigns was developed with reference to the classic literature on Mao-era China. Gordon Bennett defines campaigns as "a government sponsored effort to storm and eventually overwhelm strong but vulnerable barriers to the progress of socialism through intensive mass mobilization and active personal commitment;" see Bennett 1976, 18. Similarly, Charles Cell defines them as "an organized mobilization of collective action aimed at transforming thought patterns, class/power relationships and/or economic institutions and productivity;" see Cell 1977, 7. My definition of mobilization comes from J. P. Nettl 1967, as cited in Cell 1977, 92-3, 104-5.

[13] Tucker 1961.

authoritarian regimes, are considered undesirable by the rulers."[14] This kind of mobilized participation is, of course, anathema to liberal democratic principles, but absolutely important for understanding politics and policy implementation in much of the world.

Campaigns are more likely to occur when political leaders determine there is an urgent need for change, normally in response to a challenge or crisis, and when the change envisioned is considered so extensive that it cannot be accomplished through routine administrative practices. In launching campaigns, the state draws on latent power resources, including traditions and cultures of mobilization rooted in the legacies of revolution, war and militarism. Examining the historical origins of campaigns in China, scholars have noted the Soviet Union's influence and, more importantly, Mao's penchant for mass mobilization developed during the Jiangxi Soviet and Yan'an periods when the party had to rely on the peasantry for survival and guerrilla warfare. According to Tyrene White, during the Mao era campaigns were used as a means of advancing collectivist goals and "instilling a revolutionary ethic deep within society," and this revolutionary heritage helps to explain the persistence of campaigns in the reform era.[15]

Through campaigns, the state can circumvent institutional constraints to change by reordering existing power structures or creating alternative ones. Depending on campaign objectives, these ad hoc structures may include traditional bureaucratic actors and extra-institutional actors, such as social activists, grassroots organizations, and interest or pressure groups. Campaigns thus resemble social movements, and may in fact try to co-opt or draw strength from existing social movements, but are conceptually distinct because of the preeminent role of the state in their execution. Campaigns also resemble informal institutions in the sense of being grounded in particular norms, traditions and cultures, rather than formal organizations and

[14] Linz 1975, 191-2.
[15] White 2006, 2.

laws. Some China scholars have actually argued that campaigns are institutions. In the Mao era, people grew accustomed to cycles of mobilization and demobilization, campaign activities were routinized, and even the timing of some campaigns became predictable, particularly production campaigns linked to the economic planning cycle.[16] However, I want to suggest that this line of reasoning stretches both concepts too far. Campaigns diverge from institutions in their uncertainty. They are about suspending politics as usual in order to overhaul the status quo, which makes them powerful, but also more susceptible to unintended consequences. Institutions can affect campaign outcomes, and those outcomes sometimes include new institutional arrangements—for example, land reform (a campaign) resulting in smallholder farming (an institution). Yet ultimately campaigns and institutions represent two different modes of politics.

State-led rural modernization campaigns are policies that aim to transform the countryside through mobilization of the bureaucracy and rural society. This kind of campaign is not only an authoritarian legitimation strategy designed to shore up support for the regime through propaganda and pork barrel politics. It is also a development strategy, which seeks to overcome resource barriers and institutional constraints to change. East Asian governments adopted this technology instead of going through the normal legislative process because they viewed the rural situation with political urgency. Campaigns were considered a viable solution to the rural problem, capable of producing quick results and minimizing policy resistance from groups belonging to the urban-industrial coalition and, on a more basic level, from local actors inclined to support the status quo. Although rural modernization campaigns can have many different goals, the specific campaigns analyzed in this paper were launched primarily to achieve

[16] For the argument that campaigns are institutions, see Bennett 1976; Cell 1977; White 2006. On the cyclical pattern of mobilization, see Skinner and Winckler 1969. The point about production campaigns comes from White 2006, 8-9.

breakthroughs in rural economic and infrastructure development—to stimulate agricultural production, to raise rural incomes, and to improve access to quality roads, electricity, water, sanitation and housing.

This paper makes three main points about campaigns. First, campaigns have been indispensable to the process of rural modernization in East Asia. Whereas previous research has emphasized the role of institutions in the region's development, I show that even in places with strong institutions, the relative decline of agriculture prompted state intervention in the form of campaigns. This is not to say that campaigns are more important than institutions. Rather, the point is that East Asia's rural political economy cannot be fully understood without attention to campaigns. Second, campaigns have been especially successful at changing the village environment in ways that have a real impact on rural life. The state's heavy involvement in designing, planning and constructing villages is a significant yet often overlooked dimension of East Asian rural policy. There are surely many reasons to question these activities. Government officials may benefit politically from the creation of scientifically designed, beautifully manicured villages, even if they are in fact Potemkin villages. Or worse, the state's reorganization of rural society into carefully planned villages may result in economic disaster, as was the case with Tanzania's Ujaama village campaign of the 1970s.[17] In East Asia, however, campaigns have also contributed positively to the village environment, bringing paved roads, electricity, clean water, and trash collection services to poor and isolated communities. Finally, the political and institutional context in which a campaign is implemented matters a great deal for its outcomes. The most relevant contextual variables are the capacity for bureaucratic monitoring and the opportunities for rural participation in the policy process. If these things are

[17] Scott 1998, 223-61.

lacking, then campaigns are likely to be ineffectual or, quite the opposite, to spiral out of control. If present, they can serve as feedback mechanisms to correct misguided policy and reign in campaign excesses.

II. THE CASE OF TAIWAN

In Taiwan, the defeated Kuomintang regime (KMT or Chinese Nationalist Party) sought to regain control of mainland China by transforming the island into a model province that would legitimize its right to rule. Knowing that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had established its rural base in large part through redistributive land reform, the KMT carried out one of the "biggest noncommunist land reforms on record," which led to the creation of a smallholder farm economy with extremely low levels of inequality.[18] In addition to land reform, which was mostly completed in 1953, the KMT established an extensive network of farmers' associations and implemented an agricultural policy that resulted in nearly two decades of accelerated growth.[19] According to Taiwan's former President Lee Teng-hui, agriculture played a textbook role in Taiwan's development, meeting the domestic demand for food, contributing to the majority of exports, and providing capital and labor for industrialization.[20] As one of the first countries in the post-World War II period to achieve industrialized nation status, Taiwan stands out as an exemplary case of successful development.

To explain the rural side of Taiwan's success, existing scholarship highlights the role of two key organizations that worked closely with the KMT on rural policy: the Sino-American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) and the Taiwan Farmers' Association (FA or

[18] Wade 2004, 241.
[19] From 1952 to 1967, the average annual growth rate for agriculture was 4.6%. Production levels for crops rose 82.1%, livestock 186.3%, fruits 476.5%, and vegetables 107.6%; see Yager 1988, 2-3, 61-2.
[20] Lee 1971.

FAs). The JCRR was established in 1948 as part of the China Aid Act approved by U.S. President Harry Truman. The commission was to oversee China's postwar rural rehabilitation, but as conditions for the KMT worsened in the mainland, it relocated to Taiwan in 1949. There, it would play an important role in rural development for the next 30 years.[21] The JCRR advised KMT leaders to move quickly on land reform in order to neutralize the spread of communism. The commission also supported the revitalization of the FAs, which were first established during the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945). Taiwan's government entrusted the FAs with certain economic activities, such as purchasing rice, selling fertilizer, and providing general extension, credit and marketing services. Similar to marketing boards in Africa, it was also through the FAs that the government imposed hidden taxes on agriculture.[22] However, the FAs were not purely extractive institutions working on behalf of the government. Their broad membership base (about 95 percent of rural households had joined by 1959), and the fact that farmer members elected FA leaders, meant that resources were distributed widely throughout the countryside.[23] Taiwan is therefore often described as having a "farmers' association approach" to development.[24]

Taiwan closely conforms to the expectations of the developmental state model—the prioritization of economic development over other goals, an elite technocratic bureaucracy, strategic state intervention in the market, corporatist links between state and society, and extremely strong institutions.[25] Yet, even in this case, institutions were supplemented by campaigns. In the mid-1960s, the KMT launched the Community Development Campaign,

[21] On the history of the JCRR, see Yager 1988.
[22] On marketing boards, see Bates 1981, 11-29.
[23] The FA membership statistic comes from a JCRR survey, cited in Guo 1984, 150-5.
[24] de Lassen 1976, 1988.
[25] Wade 2004.

largely in response to evidence that rural households were struggling to survive on farm income alone. In 1960 about 42 percent of Taiwanese farmers owned less than .6 hectares (1.48 acres) of land, an amount too small to support a family, and according to a famous 1964 survey, 43 percent of farm households reported no improvement or even a decline in living conditions since land reform.[26] As part of a bundle of policies to rejuvenate the rural sector, the Community Development Campaign focused heavily on village-level infrastructure projects, such as replacing thatched roofs with tiled roofs, installing flush toilets and water taps, paving village roads, and building community centers. Along with the farmers' associations, the KMT relied on community development councils to mobilize villagers for collective action. Whereas Taiwanese sources suggest that this campaign was transformative, it has received almost no attention from Western scholars.[27]

Before getting into details about the campaign, I should note that the shift away from urban bias and pursuit of agricultural adjustment policies in Taiwan occurred for a few key reasons. First, policy change was seen as critical to reviving the rural economy. In addition to the problems just mentioned, by the late 1960s it was apparent that agricultural production was declining and the rural-urban income gap was growing. Second, protective policies had become more feasible in light of increased government revenues from the industrial sector.[28] Third, political liberalization measures, namely the legislative elections of 1969, increased the number of Taiwanese politicians serving in government. Some of these politicians had a background in agriculture, but even those who did not were still sensitive to rural issues because of Taiwan's highly organized rural electorate and the political influence of local farmers' association

[26] For the 1960 statistic, see Stavis 1974, 18. For the survey results, see Yang 1970, 267-70.
[27] I found just one English-language article that mentioned the campaign; see Knapp 1996, 785-7.
[28] Moore 1988, 139-41.

leaders.[29] Fourth, a group of agricultural advocates in the Legislative Yuan raised national awareness about rural sector problems and placed pressure on the government to change its policies. They altered public discourse about the countryside, from one focused on "agriculture" and "production" for the sake of "government revenue" to one more concerned with "farmers" and "welfare."[30] Finally, the FAs were instrumental in transmitting farmers' grievances upwards to the central agricultural bureaucracy. Their voice was strengthened by the JCRR, which regularly conducted surveys of FA members and shared those reports with the government. Government pricing policies in particular were widely criticized for depressing rural incomes, and by the early 1970s, the government had become very concerned that farmers' dissatisfaction with rural economic conditions would provide a rival base of power for local Taiwanese politicians who had previously been co-opted by the FAs.[31] All of these factors contributed to adoption of the Accelerated Rural Development Program (ARDP) in 1972.

The Community Development Campaign was launched around the same time as the ARDP. The latter represented a more typical agricultural adjustment program, calling for reduced taxes, increased spending, low-interest credit, better services, and scale agriculture. The government allocated at least 2 billion yuan to the ARDP annually between 1973 and 1979. This was a small percentage of total government spending (1-3 percent, depending on the year), but marked an important break from the past.[32] Due to the ARDP and supplementary policy

[29] On the "Taiwanization" of politics, see Gold 1986.
[30] Hsiao 1981; Liao et al. 1986.
[31] Moore 1988: 139-41; Francks 1999, 193-4, 219-20.
[32] Specifically, the ARDP consisted of "Nine Measures for Accelerating Rural Construction": abolish the rice-fertilizer barter system; eliminate the educational surtax on rural land; ease the terms of rural credit; improve agricultural marketing services; strengthen rural infrastructure; integrate production techniques; create specialized production zones (i.e. large farms); strengthen research and extension work; and encourage new rural industries; see Yager 1988, 95-8.

measures like subsidies and import restrictions, the rural-urban income gap shrank considerably from 42 to 29 percent (meaning rural residents earned 29 percent less than urban residents).[33] By itself, however, the ARDP was regarded as an insufficient solution to the rural problem. To achieve more immediate and visible results, the government embraced the technology of mass mobilization.

The KMT's favorable view of campaigns was driven by competition with the communists and the idea that revolution could be prevented through state-sponsored counterrevolution or controlled mobilization. By the late 1960s, farmers in Taiwan had become a very powerful interest group. There were no significant protests against the state or direct challenges to Chiang Kai-shek's authority, but reports of rural decline and popular discontent deeply concerned him. Chiang had been fearful of an underground communist movement since arriving in Taiwan and viewed the countryside through the lens of his failed policies on the mainland. He studied the CCP's model of organization and policy implementation, and he often borrowed directly from the communist toolkit. During land reform, for example, the KMT mimicked the communists' tactics while also trying to distinguish themselves as less violent and more civilized.[34] As virtually any rural policy document from this period shows, the regime was fixated on the question of how they lost the Chinese peasantry. And although the KMT had successfully penetrated the farmers' associations in Taiwan, it was never fully confident it could hold on to their loyalty.

In devising a new rural policy, Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, who succeeded the elder Chiang after his death in 1975, looked to past examples of campaigns in

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Government spending figures come from *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China* 1982, 467; Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction 1978, 33.

[33] Hsiao 1981, 63; Liao et al. 1986, 36.

[34] Strauss forthcoming. On the modeling of communist organization, see Dickson 1993.

mainland China. The Mass Education and Rural Reconstruction Movements of the 1920s-1930s focused on improving rural conditions through the development of autonomous village organizations. Led by Y.C. James Yen, Liang Shuming and other activist intellectuals, these movements sought to provide an alternative to communism. Yen later served as a commissioner for the JCRR and moved to Taiwan, where his ideas about grassroots community building influenced the top leadership.[35] The New Life Movement was another campaign that took place in the 1930s-1940s. Some scholars view it as linked to global fascism, whereas others emphasize that it was closely intertwined with state-building and civilian relief during the war period. Importantly, because Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo personally led the campaign, it provides a window into how they thought about the countryside. The main objective was to create an orderly and civilized society by using ideological education to reform the most basic aspects of rural life: clothing, food, housing, and behavior. Although thousands of new life community organizations were established across the country, the campaign's momentum ultimately fizzled out because the communists proved more capable of providing people with real economic and security benefits.[36] Taiwan's countryside was similarly viewed as backwards, but now the leadership understood that any campaign to reform it needed to deliver tangible change to be successful.

The Community Development Campaign was also influenced by local experiments in Taiwan. In 1955 the government launched the People's Livelihood Construction Campaign, which drew inspiration from Sun Yat-sen's ideology. It stressed ensuring equal access to land resources, sustaining high levels of production, and satisfying villagers' basic needs (defined as

[35] For recent work on these campaigns, see Merkel-Hess 2016.
[36] On the New Life Movement's fascist qualities and campaigns as counterrevolution, see Dirlik 1975. For the state-building perspective, see Ferlanti 2010.

clothing, food, housing, transportation, education and recreation). Taiwanese sources state that the campaign was intended to pick up where land reform had left off, and, given the timing, it is possible the campaign was launched in response to China's collectivization drive. Even though Taiwanese farmers maintained control over their own land and production practices, laws on compulsory labor were invoked to push forward village improvement projects. An earlier law requiring men ages 18-50 to take part in road building, irrigation, production and defense work was revised to incorporate more projects related to village infrastructure. Campaign coordination committees were formed to bring together leaders from government, schools, the police and the FAs. In addition, the government initiated a formal competition among local jurisdictions to mobilize labor and other resources. The campaign lasted for ten years and affected less than ten percent of all villages (there were 515 experimental sites in total), but its impact was nonetheless significant. Several hundred miles of roads, irrigation canals and drainage pipes were added to existing infrastructure. Other improvements included the installation or construction of embankments, water towers, pumps, bridges, rice drying areas, toilets, bathhouses, animal pens, compost houses, streetlights, televisions, radios, childcare centers, community centers, and gardens.[37]

The success of previous experiments, combined with international development trends, eventually paved the way for a more comprehensive campaign. In the 1960s when the United Nations was supporting community development programs worldwide, U.N. consultant Zhang Hongjun introduced the concept to Taiwan. It quickly gained currency among officials who were eager to raise their government's status internationally. This became even more pressing after Taiwan lost its U.N. seat to China in 1971. Earlier experiments were scaled up and repackaged as

[37] For a detailed account of the campaign, see Central Committee of the Kuomintang 1961; Li 1965. For English, see Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction 1960.

community development in a series of national policy documents that served as the foundation for the Community Development Campaign: the People's Livelihood Social Policy (1965), the Community Development Eight-year-plan (1969), and the Community Development Ten-year-plan (1972).[38] The Chinese names of these policies are listed in Table 1. Taiwan also took notice of South Korea's New Village Movement and modeled certain aspects of its approach after what the Koreans were doing, such as intensive training of village activists in order to change rural culture.[39]

Compared with most other developing countries, Taiwan's bureaucracy was actually more inclined to support rural development, and groups representing urban-industrial interests were not as strong politically. This difference had to do with historically close ties between agriculture and industry, the primacy of agriculture in the economy, and the Taiwanization of politics. The dismantling of urban-biased policies was consequently easier to execute. The bigger barrier to change, from the perspective of the leadership, was rural culture itself. They believed that land reform had created a society that was simultaneously more egalitarian and more individualistic. Furthermore, if rural backwardness stemmed from a lack of community spirit, then a campaign would be more effective than a normal piece of legislation (like the ARDP) at delivering spiritual or moral change. Mass mobilization would not only advance the material well-being of the village, but it would foster a public ethos as well.

In short, campaigns were seen as a means of development and legitimation. They could overcome barriers to change, accomplish concrete goals, and engender loyalty among the population. The framework of community development in particular was also a way of signaling

[38] On the evolution of community development policies and U.N. involvement, see Tan 1969; Hong 1978.
[39] Li 1979.

certain messages about the regime to international actors—that it was progressive and open compared to China, and that it cared about helping those left behind by industrialization. As one might expect, scholars critical of the campaign lament the state's heavy involvement as running counter to international norms about community development.[40] Yet I would suggest that if it is viewed as a state-led campaign, and not according to the ideals of community development per se, it was actually very successful.

Table 1. Community Development Policies in Taiwan, 1955-1981 [1]

Campaigns and Supporting Policies	*Chinese Name*	*Years*
People's Livelihood Construction Campaign	**基層民生建設運動**	**1955-65**
Compulsory Labor	國民義務勞動	1947
Community Development Campaign	**社區發展運動**	**1965-81**
People's Livelihood Social Policy	民生主義現階段社會政策	1965
Community Development Eight-year-plan	社區發展八年計畫	1969
Community Development Ten-year-plan	社區發展十年計畫	1972

[1] The Ten-year-plan, which was supposed to conclude in 1978, was extended through the year 1981. Single years indicate the first year that a policy became effective.

The Community Development Campaign succeeded at producing policy compliance and positive outcomes because its overarching goal was rural development, rather than extraction, and because of the context in which it was implemented. Taiwan's centralized political system and technocratic leadership facilitated bureaucratic monitoring, and although the FAs were just one of several groups responsible for campaign implementation, their strong presence in the villages prior to the campaign helped to normalize rural participation in the policy process.

In terms of goals, the Community Development Eight-year-plan (1969-1976) described the policy as a "social movement" aimed at "eliminating dirt, disorder and poverty, increasing

[40] For a negative assessment, see Xue 1987.

production and welfare, and promoting a new morality." Accordingly, in this document and the revised Ten-year-plan (1969-1978), specific projects were divided into three categories: basic infrastructure; production and social welfare; and spiritual and moral construction. This last category called for community organizations and activities that would promote healthy living and a collective consciousness, for example the formation of Boy Scout troops and Chinese musical orchestras. "Life basics" courses on civilized behavior—standing in line, wearing clean clothes, eating at a table, etc.—were also commonly conducted during the campaign.[41] By most accounts, these projects were less successful than those focused on infrastructure and production, but the emotional appeal of making the community better was still a powerful call to action.

The elimination of taxes and disbursement of grants further bolstered popular enthusiasm for the campaign, though it was not without costs. Initially the government allocated 250,000 yuan to each community. This money covered roughly half of the cost of community development, and residents were expected to provide matching funds to make up the difference. The poorest households had to borrow money or donate more of their labor to meet this requirement. To reduce their burden, the government later revised the policy so that it would contribute a greater percentage of funds for every site (about 52 percent of the cost), with even higher levels of support for poverty areas (about 84 percent). The Ten-year-plan also stated that poorer villages should be developed first, so that local governments would not be tempted to channel funds to the easiest cases, i.e. those villages near the township with a better baseline of development.[42]

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[41] For a thorough elaboration of government policy, see Republic of China Community Development Training Center 1972; Tan 1972; Wu 1986. For English, see Taiwan Provincial Government 1970.

[42] In 1972 government support amounted to 330,000 yuan for regular sites and 530,000 yuan for poverty sites; see Hong 1978, 106-8.

To facilitate local compliance, campaign coordination committees were established at the provincial, county and township levels. These were comprised of leading officials from nearly every institution, including the military and the police. The committees were charged with developing plans, disbursing funds (primarily through the FAs), and overseeing implementation. During the planning stage, village assemblies were held to solicit ideas from residents. Villages were legally defined as an extension of the township government and considered to be separate from communities, which were conceptualized as autonomous, service-oriented units. While in practice the functions of these units overlapped, two changes did affect the local leadership structure. First, some villages were merged together so that each community was roughly the same size, about 350 households. When mergers did occur—the Eight-year-plan organized all of Taiwan's 6,215 villages into 4,893 communities—leaders from different villages had to negotiate the location of community projects, a process that was undoubtedly contentious and subject to the influence of local factions. In these cases, the coordination committee was expected to play the role of mediator. Second, a younger generation of activists gained power through creation of community development councils. These were elected bodies of roughly ten people who represented a mix of traditional and new elites. The empowerment of individuals in their twenties and thirties, who otherwise might consider leaving the countryside, added to the campaign's momentum.

The community development councils operated at the village (or community) level. They were responsible for mobilizing residents and managing the day-to-day activities of the campaign. They were also in charge of community center operations and infrastructure maintenance. The village Small Agricultural Unit leader and township FA representatives usually held spots on the council and took the lead on production related projects. The township

coordination committee frequently dispatched officials to consult with council members and check on the campaign's progress. In addition, the provincial government arranged for outside inspection teams to evaluate and rank local governments based on the quality of the communities in their jurisdiction. Places that performed better were rewarded with media attention, medals, and other benefits. Taiwan's small size and centralized political system contributed to policy coherence among different levels of government. In conjunction with education and training, as well as fiscal and administrative regulations, all of these mechanisms—the campaign coordination committees, community development councils, and competitive evaluations—were used to exert central control over local authorities and increase compliance. Stated differently, these policy tools effectively brought local actors into an implementing coalition with the central government.

On the issues of rural participation and accountability to village residents, scholarly assessments are mixed. Several ethnographic case studies assert that the community development councils were weak. They point out that projects were mostly passed down from the township and that the campaign relied on compulsory labor.[43] Still other studies reach the opposite conclusion, showing that the councils crafted and adjusted development plans based on local needs and feedback, and that people were eager to contribute to projects that directly benefitted the village (this was not necessarily true of other compulsory labor projects).[44] This discrepancy in the literature likely stems from real variation in local campaign experiences.

Nevertheless, there are a few reasons to believe that, on the whole, the campaign was implemented in a relatively flexible and participatory manner. First, the example of the farmers'

[43] See, for example, Zhuang 1972; Chen 1973; Xue 1987.
[44] Huang 1978, 1979.

associations demonstrates that villagers regularly voted in elections and treated them seriously.[45] Council elections were probably treated the same way, especially given the influx of new resources tied to community development. There was an expectation that council members would advocate for villagers to higher levels of the state, which was reinforced by villagers' own ability to communicate their preferences to the FAs or outside inspection teams. Second, despite government claims to the contrary, the countryside already had a rich associational life**.** Besides the FAs, there were irrigation associations, credit cooperatives, labor exchange groups, temple associations, and a myriad of groups organized around lineage, neighborhood, gender, age, and profession.[46] These organizations surely had their own views on how to improve the community and wanted to see those reflected in the campaign. So even if the community development councils were weak, there were still other groups that sought out partnerships with the government and offered their contacts and resources in exchange for influence. Third, Taiwanese sources are filled with references to Western examples of community development and translations of phrases that evoke democratic norms of participation: civic organization, community action, inclusion of the poor in decision making, sense of belonging, and felt needs, to name just a few.[47] Since the intended audience of these materials was local officials and campaign activists, it seems the regime's embrace of these norms was not just about international posturing. It was also about a real commitment to grassroots engagement.

The campaign had a moderate effect the agricultural economy. While on the one hand production-related infrastructure was successfully upgraded and expanded, on the other hand efforts to develop new rural sidelines and scale up production fell flat. In fact between 1960 and

[45] Elections for FA leaders began in the mid-1950s. On the competitiveness of elections, see Bosco 1992.
[46] Yang 1970.
[47] See, for example, Xiong 1973; Wang 1974.

1990, the number of households with farms smaller than 1 hectare (2.47 acres) increased from about 67 to 75 percent, and the number of farms larger than 3 hectares (7.41 acres) decreased from 3.3 to 2.5 percent.[48] The difficulty of scaling up agriculture in Taiwan, like the rest of East Asia, was not only a product of land reform but also the FAs, which served to protect and entrench the position of small farmers in Taiwanese society.[49]

The Community Development Campaign's greatest impact was to change the village environment. It led to dramatic improvements in public infrastructure, sanitation, and housing. Most if not all of Taiwan's villages were affected, and the sheer scope of the campaign in terms of the number of projects implemented was impressive (see Table 2). Official statistics also reveal an unevenness to project implementation, meaning that different communities experienced different kinds of change. Apart from variation in resources, which certainly existed across communities, another explanation for this unevenness is that the campaign did not impose a one-size-fits-all vision of modernity on the countryside. Villagers had some degree of choice over which projects to implement, and there were fewer negative outcomes as a result. For instance, older homes were preserved and renovated instead of torn down and rebuilt, so there was much less displacement than occurred during similar campaigns in Korea (the New Village Movement, 1970s) and China (Building a New Socialist Countryside, 2000s).[50] The campaign was less costly for villagers as well: whereas Taiwan's government shouldered over 60 percent of

[48] Huang 1993, 50, 60.
[49] Taiwan's Second Stage Land Reform of 1980 tried to resolve this problem but was only moderately successful. For a discussion this policy and comparison of East Asian countries, see Bramall 2004.
[50] I found only one source that mentioned how construction companies took advantage of the campaign in order to build large housing complexes; see Hong 1978, 115-6.

campaign expenses, the Korean and Chinese governments covered less than 40 percent, even though more money was spent overall in those countries.[51]

[51] On Korea, see Park 2009, 126. During a research trip to China, I visited several villages where residents had to sign contracts agreeing to cover 60 percent or more of expenses.

Table 2. Results of the Community Development Campaign in Taiwan, 1969-1981

Total Number of Communities	4,025
Total Number of Community Residents	7,328,074 (about 1.3 million households)
Total Cost of Community Development	6,082,449,911 yuan
Government Expenditures	3,687,463,819 yuan (about 61%)
Community Expenditures	2,394,986,092 yuan (about 39%)
Basic Infrastructure Projects	
1. Water towers	9,274
2. Toilets	172,307
3. Showers	37,107
4. Drainage pipes	10,395,456 meters
5. Pathways	21,055,140 square meters
6. Parks	1,520
7. Playgrounds	913
8. Athletic fields	1,016
9. Activities centers	3,531
10. Home sanitation improvement	335,307 households
11. Township roads	71,023 kilometers
12. Village roads	57,132 kilometers
Production and Social Welfare Projects	
1. Rice drying areas	2,101,259 square meters
2. Animal pens	55,831
3. Compost houses	39,478
4. Technology training classes	3,898
5. Farm improvement stations	1,577
6. Childcare centers	1,725
7. Agricultural cooperatives	122
8. Home renovation for the poor	20,262 households
9. Home construction for the poor	25,481 households
10. Employment assistance	33,405 people
11. Community production funds	1,063
12. Cooperative farms	49
Spiritual and Moral Construction Projects	
1. “Life basics” courses	12,706
2. Cultural and athletic activities	20,383
3. Recognizing good people/deeds	4,343
4. Elderly associations	1,909
5. Boy scout troops	389
6. Classes for mothers	2,945
7. Sports tournaments	494

Source: Taiwan Provincial Government Social Affairs Department, cited in Liu 1991, 69-72.

To summarize, this case study highlights the mobilizational character of Taiwanese politics. The use of campaigns to spur development stands out as being quite different than the conventional wisdom. The developmental state model is correct in its portrayal of Taiwan's institutions, but it does not fully account for what happened in the countryside. The state did not "pick winners" and let the market do the rest. Instead, it launched a modernization campaign to speed up the pace of rural transformation, a decision that had more in common with Maoism or Leninism than Japanese industrial policy. At the same time, this portrait of the campaign as a top-down policy with genuine societal participation makes the Taiwanese case diverge from a purely Leninist system.

The Community Development Campaign succeeded at improving rural conditions because it occurred in a particular context that prevented the campaign from working against farmers' interests. It was meticulously planned and implemented by a technocratic bureaucracy operating in a highly centralized political system. Frequent inspections and crosscutting coordination agencies stopped government support from being diverted to other purposes. More importantly, Taiwan's strong rural organizations provided a critical check against campaign excesses. The community development councils and the FAs, with their extensive organizational reach and politically influential leadership, were crucial for shaping local plans and generating mass participation. Without them, the use of compulsory labor alone would have likely failed to sustain the campaign. And it was these various checks on local governments from above and below which contributed to campaign success.

III. THE BROADER EAST ASIAN REGION

Situating Taiwan's rural policies within a broader regional context reveals that they are part of a long tradition of rural modernization campaigns dating back to Meiji-era Japan. There

are in fact several examples of such campaigns in Japan, beginning with the Local Improvement Movement at the turn of the 20th century, continuing with the Rural Revitalization Campaign in the wake of the Great Depression, and then resuming after World War II with the New Village and New Life Campaigns. At each of these moments, the government's response to rural decline and unrest was to mobilize the bureaucracy and rural society for collective village improvement. The Rural Revitalization Campaign (1932-1941) was the largest in scope and was intended to co-opt two streams of social protest—a tenant union movement that erupted in the 1920s and an agrarianist movement, which produced a generation of rural spokespersons who successfully lobbied the government for relief after the Great Depression devastated Japan's silk and rice markets, the mainstays of the rural economy. Agrarianism was also a force behind local revitalization initiatives, which provided inspiration for the national government's campaign. According to historian Kerry Smith, the campaign led to the successful upgrading of infrastructure in 80 percent of Japan's villages and brought disaffected groups into closer alignment with the state.[52]

In South Korea, Park Chung-hee decided to adopt protective policies for agriculture after being seriously challenged in the 1967 and 1971 presidential elections by opposition candidates who successfully used the issue of low rice prices to capture much of the rural vote. The New Village or Saemaul Movement (1970-1979) attempted to raise farm output and income levels in at least two ways. First, the state orchestrated a green revolution by forcibly distributing a high yield variety of rice called Tong'il (unification). Rice procurement prices were also adjusted such that rural incomes actually surpassed urban incomes in 1974. However, by the late 1970s the government could no longer afford its price support policy, and Tong'il production was

[52] Smith 2001. See also Waswo 1988.

eventually abandoned as consumers showed a preference for other varieties.[53] Second, the state promoted the development of rural industry as an avenue for off-farm employment, but this effort, known as Factory Saemaul, failed to curb a rural exodus to the cities. Between 1970 and 1990, more than half of the rural population (7.7 out of 14.4 million people) migrated to urban areas.[54]

Neither Tong'il nor Factory Saemaul was very successful, but in the area of rural infrastructure, the New Village Movement produced enormous changes. Villagers were mobilized for the construction of roads, bridges, irrigation channels, sewage systems, warehouses, and community centers. Village homes were renovated with the installation of water taps, electricity, telephones, and blue tiled roofs. Whereas some observers lamented these changes as damaging to traditional aesthetic values, for many people, the new roofs became a welcome symbol of modernity, since the old thatched roofs made of rice straw had to be replaced every year.[55] And among the Korean public today, the campaign is remembered as a kind of golden age. In 2008, to mark the 60th anniversary of the Republic of Korea, *The Chosun Ilbo* published the results of a Korean Gallup poll about the country's most important achievements. The New Village Movement topped the list for over 40 percent of respondents, receiving more votes than any other event, including the 1987 democracy movement and the 1988 Olympics.[56]

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[53] For Korean government data on incomes in the 1970s, see Kang 1999, 50. On Korea's green revolution, see Burmeister 1988.
[54] Park 1998, 142-3, 212.
[55] For a critical view, see Steinberg 1982, 17-8.
[56] The top ten achievements were 1) the New Village Movement 2) the Olympics 3) the five-year economic plans, especially the 1970s heavy and chemical industrialization drive 4) completion of the Seoul-Pusan highway 5) the World Cup 6) the Gwangju pro-democracy movement 7) development of the semiconductor industry 8) per capita gross income surpassing 20,000 US dollars 9) the South-North (inter-Korean) summits 10) the 1987 democracy movement; see Hong 2008. The New Village Movement was also ranked first in a survey conducted ten years earlier for the 50th anniversary; see Kang 1999, 50.

Similar to Taiwan, Korean officials operated within a highly centralized system. Frequent inspections and mass supervision, facilitated by public radio announcements about villages that would be receiving funding, worked to ensure that government assistance was not diverted. Rural participation in the policy process was not the norm, but, significantly, most campaign decisions were made at the village level with clear input from village activists. By organizing local "Saemaul councils," focusing on village improvement projects, and supporting a large numbers of villages (not just a few models), the government succeeded at generating widespread approval for the campaign.

Finally, the case of China suggests that campaigns do not always (or usually) result in positive outcomes. In 2005, following a period of escalating rural protest, the Hu Jintao government adopted a comprehensive rural modernization program called Building a New Socialist Countryside (NSC). It aimed to reduce the rural-urban income gap, stimulate agricultural production, and improve rural public goods provision. The central government never called the New Socialist Countryside a campaign because of the Maoist connotations of that term, but many officials nonetheless understood and implemented it as a campaign. Local plans were drawn up that emphasized speed and hard targets, and policy coordination committees were formed to realign the interests of various departments. Cadre work teams were sent down to the villages, where they recruited activists and, in some cases, organized residents for collective action. Images of model villages and propaganda slogans about a better life appeared in newspapers, on billboards, and along the sides of buildings and fences. Even the phrase "building a new socialist countryside" originated in the 1950s when Maoism as a development ideology was at its peak.

Although China's shift away from urban bias was successful in some ways, it was also extremely problematic. Early in the Hu administration, a consensus was reached that rural society was in crisis and something needed to be done. Yet there was much disagreement about the ultimate purpose of the New Socialist Countryside. Was it to speed up the process of urbanization, to stimulate domestic consumption, or to promote rural development as an end in itself? This debate had the effect of expanding local discretion over policy implementation, and it went unresolved until the leadership transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping, whose policies represented a clear victory for those advocating urbanization.

This level of discretionary local authority over how and what to implement did not exist in Taiwan and Korea. In those cases, the center achieved controlled decentralization. There were strong checks on local officials from above, combined with some checks from below, due to the mobilization of rural organizations and village activists. In contrast, the Chinese case is better described as co-opted decentralization or even decentralized chaos, with weak checks on local officials from above and virtually no checks from below. In many places, local officials blocked central efforts to promote balanced rural development by prioritizing only those goals that benefitted the urban-industrial sector, such as housing construction and land consolidation. In addition, the fact that rural citizens were, for the most part, left out of the policy process made the aggressive pursuit of those goals that much easier. Whereas Taiwan's farmers' organizations are some of the strongest in the world, China's are among the weakest. The result was a continuation of rural resource extraction. In the name of village modernization, millions of people were moved into apartments, and their former housing plots were sold off for urban-industrial development.[57]

[57] Looney 2015.

In conclusion, this overview of the region, though certainly incomplete, is suggestive of the argument I am making about institutions and campaigns. It is different than the conventional wisdom about East Asian rural development, which emphasizes colonial legacies, land reforms, and the emergence of developmental states. On a basic level, it highlights the centrality of campaigns in an unexpected context—countries that are not in a state of perpetual revolution, and to the contrary are known for their technical-rational approach to policymaking. It also provides preliminary support for the contention that campaigns can have a positive or negative effect on development, depending on institutional context and especially on whether they are carried out in partnership with rural citizens.

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