Social Sources of Counterrevolution:
State-Sponsored Contention during Revolutionary Episodes

Mark R. Beissinger
Princeton University

In normal times of relative quiescence and state dominance, mass demonstrations organized by autocratic regimes serve multiple purposes. They can be used by regimes as a way of controlling local state agents or obtaining information about local circumstances that might otherwise be inaccessible (O'Brien and Li 2006). They can become ritualized and serve as a way of reinforcing domination to the population (Scott 1990). They can be used to signal support for state policies to either foreign or domestic audiences (Weiss 2013). And they can be used as a prophylactic against the emergence of organized opposition or as a way of marginalizing existing opposition movements (Atwal and Bacon 2012).

By contrast, in unusual times of direct revolutionary challenge to autocratic regimes, the purposes of state-sponsored mobilization narrow considerably. They have at times been used by one portion of the elite to attack another, as a way of overthrowing or altering the circle of those holding power (Radnitz 2010). More often, state-sponsored mass mobilization in the context of revolutionary challenge has been used as a means of defending an incumbent regime against waves of opposition-led popular mobilization--what I refer to in this paper as "counterrevolution." In a recent article, Slater and Smith (2016, 1472) defined counterrevolution as "collective and reactive efforts to defend the status quo and its varied range of dominant elites against a credible threat to overturn them from below." In this chapter I consider a revolutionary threat to be the materialization of a mass siege aimed at displacing the incumbent regime and substantially altering the political or

social order,[1] and counterrevolutionary mobilization to be civilian mobilization aimed at countering a credible revolutionary threat. The obvious paradox of counterrevolutionary mobilization is that, while it is ostensibly civilian in composition, it usually enjoys support, encouragement, close affiliation or connection with, or direction from the regime that seeks to defend. This of course raises deeper questions of why some regimes resort to counterrevolutionary mobilization to carry out repressive functions normally assumed by the military or the police. Moreover, the degree to which counterrevolutionary mobilization functions autonomously of the state varies. In some cases counterrevolutionary mobilizations have emerged more through encouragement than through direct orchestration, and counterrevolutionaries may mobilize less in support of that regime than in opposition to the social forces represented by revolutionary movements. All of this creates ambiguities and tensions within counterrevolutionary mobilizations.

Slater and Smith (2016) observe that sequence is a central element of counterrevolutionary mobilizations, in that they emerge in response to the presence of a credible revolutionary threat. However, some regimes may institutionalize counterrevolutionary mobilization as a means of consolidating control or preventing revolutionary mobilizations from materializing in the first place--so that the divide between mobilization within and outside of revolutionary episodes may be less clear-cut than I have

[1]This definition bears similarity to Goodwin's (2001, 9) definition of revolution: "any and all instances in which a state or political regime is overthrown and thereby transformed by a popular movement in an irregular, extraconstitutional, and/or violent fashion." In this paper I treat revolution as a distinct mode of regime-change that differs in fundamental respects from other modes of regime-change such as military coups, electoral turnovers in mixed authoritarian regimes, government-initiated political reform from above, or foreign invasions aimed at regime-change. Revolutions differ from military coups and foreign invasions aimed at regime-change in the large number of civilian (i.e., non-military or police) actors involve. They differ as well as from electoral turnovers in mixed authoritarian regimes and political reform from above as modes of regime-change in the specifically extra-institutional siege of government that they entail.

implied. Moreover, the line between revolution and counterrevolution grows further blurred when one considers the origins of administered mass organizations like the Basij in contemporary Iran--created as a mass movement by a revolutionary regime to defend the revolution against internal and external enemies, but eventually coming to function as an arm of the state and as a counterrevolutionary instrument for attacking new revolutionary opposition movements (Golkar 2015).

Slater and Smith focus their attentions on what they call "counterrevolutionary political orders" in postcolonial states (i.e., durable political formations founded on the basis of countering revolutionary challenges) and on governance by political parties that emerge for this purpose. I focus instead on what happens more narrowly within revolutionary situations, on the ways in which autocratic regimes utilize mass mobilization to counter revolutionary challengers, and specifically on the types of individuals mobilized toward these ends. We know considerably more about the networks, identities, and organizational structures that sustain revolutionary mobilization than about the political and social sources of counterrevolutionary mobilization, which has been treated only sporadically in the literature.[2] Why do autocratic regimes foster counterrevolutionary mass mobilizations as a tactic for undermining revolutionary challenges rather than deal directly with revolutionary challengers through their own bureaucratic or police agencies? The tendency in much of the literature on revolution has been to treat individual participation in counterrevolutionary mobilization as motivated primarily by material concerns (either as a result of cash payments, hierarchical authority, or threats to jobs) and subject to strong selective incentives from bureaucratic agencies and the police. But is this always true, and

[2]For a recent attempt to examine the diffusion of counter-revolution during the Revolutions of 1848 and on elite learning from prior examples, see Weyland 2016.

to what extent does counterrevolutionary mobilization depend upon autonomous social divisions within society? Moreover, what makes for effective counterrevolutionary mobilization (i.e., counterrevolutionary mobilization that successfully defends an incumbent regime)? While we have a great deal of anecdotal information about counterrevolutionary movements, with a few exceptions we have generally lacked the kind of systematic data on who participates in counterrevolutionary mobilizations to be able to know the types of individuals who are mobilized in defense of the status quo and how they compare with others in society. This paper is a partial attempt to address this lacuna.

Specially, I make several arguments. First, I argue that counterrevolutionary mobilization has always been an integral part of revolutionary processes going back to the origins of modern revolution in the 17th and 18th centuries, though its role in revolutionary processes has not been adequately theorized or understood.

Second, I argue that counterrevolutionary mobilization tends to be composite in character. I use the word composite (rather than coalitional) to indicate that, rather than constituting an alliance of autonomous actors (as occurs, for instance, within revolutionary coalitions), counterrevolutionary mobilization instead consists of parts that are pulled together, usually by agents of the state or by those affiliated with the state. Some element of counterrevolutionary mobilization is usually hierarchical, relying on selective incentives and patronage networks deployed by the regime (sometimes payment, sometimes hierarchical authority). But there is often a more autonomous element as well. This more autonomously based counterrevolutionary mobilization can emerge from a variety of sources. Incumbent regimes often enjoy a social base that transcends patronage relationships due cultural or class cleavages, personal networks of like-minded individuals, or ideological and programmatic divisions. This autonomous counterrevolutionary

participation is often motivated less by enthusiasm for the incumbent regime than by fear or dislike of the social forces represented within revolutionary movements. These disparate hierarchical and autonomous constituencies within counterrevolution are pieced together (i.e., "composed") by incumbent regimes in the context of revolutionary challenges, with little integration across these elements.

Finally, I argue that the ability (or inability) of regimes to command autonomous counterrevolutionary mobilization that relies on more than just patronage ties and selective incentives is an important part of an explanation for how incumbent regimes survive or fail to survive revolutionary challenges. Thus, as a political process, revolutions are much more complex phenomena than simplistic stories about elites versus masses would make them out to be, and counterrevolutionary mobilization deserves more attention in our theorizing about revolution than it has thus far received.

The Origins and Purposes of Civilian Counterrevolutionary Mobilization

Civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization has been intimately connected with the rise of modern revolution. In the so-called Glorious Revolution of 1688, for example, Irish Catholics and Scottish Highlander clans put up significant violent resistance to the new Williamite order, providing a social base for counterrevolutionary efforts aimed at restoring King James V to the throne (Pincas 2009, 267-77). Similarly, in the American Revolution (1775-1783) between 30 and 50 thousand Loyalists fought on the side of the British, with up to 20 percent of the white population of the colonies openly supporting the Crown. Indeed, Loyalists are said to have participated in approximately three-quarters of the battles and skirmishes of the revolution (Brown 1965, 249; Allen 2010, xix-xx). Loyalism in the American Revolution was a distinctly urban and coastal phenomenon. Its most significant social

sources were office-holders and appointees of the Crown, wealthy landlords and owners of landed estates, merchants with strong British interests, urban professionals, recent immigrants from England and Scotland, ethnic and religious minorities who feared the implications of a power-shift for their personal security, freed or runaway slaves hoping for British support against slavery, and Indian tribes opposed to farmers and settlers (Calhoon 1973, 431-435; Brown 1965).[3] Still, as some have noted, "the British government was generally woefully negligent in rallying and making use of the Loyalists" (Brown 1965, 251), and the weakness of Loyalist mobilization in support of the Crown is considered an important factor in the defeat of the British.

In the French Revolution an anti-revolutionary majority in the countryside confronted a pro-revolutionary minority based primarily in cities--a gap that widened in particular as the new revolutionary regime began to move against the power of the clergy and local aristocracy and imposed mass conscription on the population. The eventual result was a civil war in the countryside, leading to mass repressions by republican armies. As Tilly (1989, 86) noted, "Contrary to the old image of a unitary people welcoming the arrival of long-awaited reform, local histories of the revolution make clear that France's revolutionaries established their power through struggle, and frequently over stubborn popular resistance . . . Counterrevolution occurred not where everyone opposed the revolution, but where irreconcilable differences divided well- defined blocs of supporters and opponents."

French counterrevolution began as insurrectionary plots by aristocrats hoping to capitalize on support from foreign powers. It quickly came to encompass a variety of social actors drawn from the old regime's privileged orders--clergy, rural gentry, country squires,

[3]Only in New York and New Jersey were farmers well-represented in Loyalist ranks.

disgruntled army officers. In Sutherland's (1986) words, "The combination of hurt pride, ancient loyalties, fear of disorder, loss of income, and the prospect of unemployment propelled many of these men into careers of conspiracy and exile" (112). But counterrevolution also tapped into deeper societal cleavages in France. Religion was clearly a major factor that mobilized large numbers against the revolution, splitting the third estate across class and occupational lines and pitting parishioners against supporters of the new regime. As Sutherland (107-114) notes, one could find merchants, silk- and textile-workers, artisans, and peasants on both sides of the political divide depending on local economic conditions, the loyalties of local elites, and the contours of religious belief.[4] Nor was counterrevolution confined to a particular region of France (despite the eventual uprising in Vendée in 1793). As Tilly (1964) emphasizes, the urban/rural divide was one of the key cleavages separating revolutionary from counterrevolutionary, though again activity varied considerably according to local circumstances. But above all, counterrevolution in France was deeply decentralized, with units operating more or less autonomously without central coordination.

In many ways, French counterrevolution set the mold for much of the civilian counterrevolutionary mobilizations throughout the nineteenth century. It was decentralized and reactive, occurring in response to the revolutionary seizure of power and grievances fostered by revolutionary governance. Arno Mayer (2000, 7) distinguished between what he called the "composite and organized *counter*-revolution from the top and the spontaneous and irregular *anti*-revolution from the ground up" that characterized opposition to the French Revolution. As he noted, anti-revolution traditionally took the

[4]A similar point is made by Tilly (1964, 323-325), who cites figures showing that a large portion of the participants in the Vendée uprising were non-peasants.

form of peasant revolts that materialized against the measures introduced by newly established revolutionary regimes--and often remained unconnected with the elite-driven counterrevolution directed from above. Indeed, Mayer (2000, 57) argued that counterrevolution could only be effective if it were coordinated and connected with this anti-revolution from below (i.e., intersecting with genuinely-driven mass mobilization).

Throughout much of nineteenth century this gap between regime-organized modes of anti-revolutionary struggle and mass counterrevolutionary mobilization remained considerable. As Weyland (2016) documented, in the Revolutions of 1848 the strategies of Prussian and Austrian monarchs for countering the revolutionary threats they faced were largely oriented toward isolation and repression of revolutionary elites rather than mass counter-mobilization--specifically, separating liberal-oriented legislatures from their mass bases by relocating these assemblies to provincial towns and then closing them down by force. Weyland contends that "in a hierarchical society with a strong, coercion-wielding state, reactionaries' careful evaluations of the domestic opportunity structure were distinctly top-heavy, focused on middle and elite sectors more than the popular masses" (223). But in Paris a novel twist on counterrevolution was introduced by the new revolutionary regime itself: the use of organized paramilitaries, recruited from the population, as a way of countering revolutionary threats. The new Provisional Government brought to power through the revolutionary overthrow of Louis Phillippe in February 1848 was threatened by a second more radical insurrection in June led by the National Workshops and fueled in significant part by the new regime's tax and social policies. The most effective force in putting down the June Uprising was a Mobile Guard--a paid, 20-thousand-person, full-time militia organized by the Provisional Government. Ironically, it

took a revolutionary government to invent the practice of mobilizing populations into paramilitaries for the purpose of countering revolution.

Marx (1978, 62) claimed that these paramilitary groups consisted primarily of hired lumpenproletariat ("thieves and criminals of all kinds, living on the crumbs of society, people without definite trade, vagabonds"). It was Marx who first gave voice to what we might call the "thuggish" theory of counterrevolutionary mobilization: the idea that civilians participating in counterrevolutionary efforts are paid criminals hired by the regime to beat heads. In some circumstances this may be true. However, detailed research by Traugott (1980, 2002) has uncovered that those recruited into the Mobile Guard in 1848 differed little in terms of occupational background from the insurgents that they were charged with suppressing (both were recruited primarily from among the artisanal classes). Mobile Guard members were considerably younger than their revolutionary counterparts, suggesting their greater economic vulnerability. But Traugott argues that it was the process of organizational recruitment and socialization into the Mobile Guard (and in particular, their thorough isolation in barracks) that made them such a loyal and effective weapon against revolutionary mobilization. Traugott's findings are a warning against overly simplistic characterizations of counterrevolution. Others, such as Gould (1995), have pointed to a spatial and network dimension differentiating those who mobilized as revolutionaries in 1848 and those who did not, noting another important dimension of counterrevolutionary mobilization: the key role played by locality and personal networks in shaping counterrevolutionary recruitment.

By the early twentieth century a number of autocratic regimes began experimenting with yet another model of civilian mobilization for countering revolutionary challenges: the organization of mass movements and parties. In the midst of the Revolution of 1905 in

Russia, for instance, a series of counterrevolutionary mass movements burst onto the political scene, the most infamous of which was the Union of Russian People (and its affiliated organization, the Black Hundred). These movements organized demonstrations, street fights, pogroms, assassinations, and vigilante actions aimed at defending Tsarist autocracy, defeating revolutionary threats, and preserving aristocratic privilege and Russian ethnic dominance throughout the Russian Empire (Lang 2007). While the leadership of the movement consisted of members of the upper and middle classes with close connections to the police, the rank-and-file were recruited largely from workers, peasants, shopkeepers, priests, and professionals, as well as criminals and the unemployed. The police actively abetted the development of the movement, even printing pogromist leaflets in some instances. As Lang (2007, 77-79) describes the attractions for joining, the motives were mixed:

> Many undeniably believed in the organization's stated goals of fighting the revolutionaries and protecting the autocracy . . . But there was more to URP recruitment than pure political conviction . . . Some people clearly joined the organization thanks to the prospect of jobs, money-making opportunities, and power associated with membership in a movement that had the tsar's blessing . . . Some rank-and-file members viewed the organization as a means to drum up customers for their businesses, even using their speeches during URP meetings as opportunities to hawk their wares . . . [And some] members of the URP's various paramilitary groups exploited their positions to earn money through robberies and extortion schemes, particularly aimed at Jews . . . The prospect of engaging in organized violence represented a final incentive for joining the URP.

At its height the Union of Russian People encompassed over 400 thousand members, but after 1907, when the threat of revolution receded, it went into steep decline, in part due to the corrupt habit of its leadership for largescale skimming from state subsidies. Nevertheless, it played some role in reconsolidation of Tsarist power over the Duma and

over Russian society and the rollback of political reforms enacted in the immediate wake of the 1905 Revolution.

Since the early twentieth century, civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization has become a standard tool by which incumbent regimes seek to undermine revolutionary threats. There are a number of reasons why this has been the case, and why, in addition to using police or military to repress or engaging in concessions, autocratic regimes turn to civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization as a means for undermining revolutions.

For one thing, even when it is entirely involuntary and relies solely upon hierarchical authority, patronage ties, or selective incentives, civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization demonstrates to elites and to the population the continuing power of the regime and its ability to control institutions and command popular resources, thereby raising the perceived costs of defection. As Graeme Robertson (2009, 530) has observed, "Maintaining the incumbent advantage . . . depends to a significant extent on maintaining an air of invincibility or permanence, and convincing other potential leaders and elites that their best hopes for advancement lie in continuing to work together with the ruling group rather than organizing against it." If the success of revolutionary challenges depends on the ability of oppositions to stimulate defections from within the ruling coalition, then demonstrating the continuing coherence of the regime's institutional control is one way to render defection less attractive.

Second, autocratic regimes facing revolutionary threats may prefer the use of civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization as a tool for violent repression over the use of the police or military for three reasons: 1) it can help to preserve the morale and institutional coherence of the military and police; 2) it can complicate efforts by oppositions to organize effective backlash mobilizations in response to repression; and 3) it can help to justify the

imposition of states of emergency that facilitate extraordinary measures to suppress revolutionary uprisings. Repression is never cost-free to governments. Not only does it take a toll on a regime's legitimacy within society, but it also requires institutional resources, and those resources are not inexhaustible. As the scholarly literature on revolutions has come to emphasize, in generating and applying resources for repression, the cohesion of state institutions (and particularly, the cohesion of those institutions called upon to carry out repression--the army and the police) is critical for explaining the effects of repression (Skocpol 1979). Defections from the military or police are much more likely when the military or police are in direct contact with oppositional forces or repeatedly suffer significant casualties as a result of being deployed against crowds for purposes of repression. For example, declining morale within the military and police as a result of their constant deployment to put down nationalist unrest throughout the country was a key element in the refusal of many military and KGB officers to defend the Soviet regime at the time of its collapse in 1991 (Beissinger 2002). Revolutionaries have long advocated fraternization as a strategy for undermining the coherence of a regime's forces of order (see Barany 2013; Ketchley 2014). For all these reasons, using civilians to carry out repression rather than the military and police directly can help a regime avoid some of the circumstances that can lead to elite defections from these key institutions.

Moreover, repression can produce unpredictable consequences--at times leading to demobilization, at other times causing backlash effects that magnify opposition (Lichbach 1987). The success of government repression against protestors has been shown to depend upon a long list of factors, including the severity of the repression, the consistency of the repression relative to concessions, the size of the opposition, the thickness of opposition networks, the degree of openness of the media, the tactical flexibility of opposition, public

expectations emerging from external events, regime-type, and the coherence and will of the government. But the ability to attribute blame is a critical part of the framing processes necessary for producing backlash mobilization. The inability to attribute blame is known to decrease significantly the likelihood of mobilization (Benford and Snow 2000; Javeline 2003). Autocratic regimes may be attracted to masking responsibility for repression by using civilians to repress revolutionary threats rather than the military or police, as repression carried out by civilians blurs the ability of the populations to assign blame on the government for repression, lowering the likelihood of backlash.

Violent clashes between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary civilians can also provide opportunities for the regime to justify a declaration of emergency and the imposition of political order, thereby legitimating harsher and more systematic government repression of revolutionary challengers. In its attempts to halt the Baltic drives to independence in 1991, for example, Moscow attempted to precipitate a crisis in the Baltic republics in order to pave the way for declaring emergency rule. In Lithuania this was done by mobilizing demonstrations by local Russians and Poles, who demanded the resignation of the Lithuanian government over recent prices increases and tried to storm the parliament. In Latvia, after a series of mysterious bombings carried by the Soviet army to make it appear that the situation had gotten out of control, local Russian-speakers were directed to organize demonstrations and attempted (unsuccessfully) to seize control over the parliament. Kremlin-controlled media portrayed the region as having slipped into chaos, and in both republics civilian National Salvation Committees were formed demanding that emergency rule be introduced by Moscow to quell disorder (See Senn 1995; Jundzis 2009). The specific goal in these cases was to create disorder through civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization in order to legitimate the imposition of order, with the hope of using the

occasion to marginalize revolutionary challenges. In this instance, the strategy failed, largely because of the weak commitment of Russian-speakers in the Baltic to counterrevolution and to the appearance of widespread civilian opposition in Moscow to imposing martial law (Beissinger 2002).

Of course, violence against protestors carried out by civilian counterrevolutionaries can also exacerbate or fail to quell revolutionary mobilization, playing into revolutionary narratives. Such was the case, for instance, in the infamous Battle of the Camel in Tahrir Square on February 2, 2011. Ketchley (2016) has documented the steady growth of pro-Mubarak demonstrations in Egypt beginning on January 28th, the "Friday of Anger." Most pro-regime protests coincided with anti-regime demonstrations and were used as opportunities for Mubarak's supporters to harass and repress the opposition. On February 2nd hired thugs armed with swords and cudgels riding camels and horses attacked protestors. Others threw Molotov cocktails at protestors while police snipers shot from higher locations, killing and injuring hundreds. Organized by businessmen close to the regime and members of Mubarak's government (including his son Gamal), we know from subsequent testimonies that these thuggish elements had a variety of motives for participation. Some were recruited by stable owners in the district of El-Haram (where the Great Pyramids are located), believing that the protests were taking a toll on their livelihood of tourism. Others were simply paid to participate. But there were also some who attacked protesters out of their personal beliefs (formed largely through the pro-regime messages broadcast on state-run media at the time) that the protestors represented "enemies of the nation" (Tarek 2011). Broadcast on Al-Jazeera and other media, the barbaric scenes of thugs attacking protestors with swords helped seal the fate of the Mubarak regime, forming, in Ketchley's (2014, 174) words, "the last serious attempt by the Mubarak regime

to displace the occupation of Tahrir." There may strong tactical reasons for autocratic regimes to engage in civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization. But there are also many instances in which such strategies fail.

Third, counterrevolutionary mobilization, if sufficiently large, can visibly demonstrate the limits of support for revolutionary opposition within society, thereby undermining revolutionary claims to popular legitimacy. Particularly in an age in which visual images of crowds are displayed on television or available through social media, crowd size signals critical information to potential participants whose decision to participate often rely on the level of participation by others. In Kuran's (1997) terms, the larger the size of pro-government crowds, the higher the thresholds for individuals to reveal their true preferences over regime-change. Under these conditions, civilian bandwagoning with the opposition would be less appealing, while bandwagoning with the incumbent regime grows more attractive. And the more divided society appears to be over the issue of regime-change, and the more those members of society who favor the status quo are willing to mobilize in defense of the regime, the more hollow opposition claims to represent the preferences of "the people" would appear to be. Thus, one strategy followed by regimes facing credible revolutionary threats has been to try to mobilize very large crowds in support of the status quo. In the so-called Pearl Revolution in Bahrain in 2011, after a week of opposition demonstrations and strikes by tens of thousands of predominantly Shiite protestors aimed at securing the introduction of parliamentary rule, the monarchy mobilized its own large-scale Sunni counter-demonstration of up 120 thousand (billed at the time by the government as the largest demonstration in Bahraini history) on February 21,

2011.[5] The event in turn sparked even larger revolutionary protests by the Shiite majority. While some of the participants in pro-government demonstrations were foreign workers coerced into participating, most participants were Sunni citizens frightened by the implications of majority parliamentary rule in a country in which they constituted only 30 percent of the population.

Portions of a population that function within a hierarchical setting and are dependent on state institutions or local brokers connected into the incumbent regime are likely targets of counterrevolutionary mobilization through selective incentives--in particular, peasants, factory workers employees of state enterprises, foreign workers, or employees of businesses dependent on state contracts. As states have grown stronger, populations have concentrated in cities, and bureaucratic organization has flourished, organizational settings such factories or government offices have grown increasingly central to the politics of counterrevolution relative to the diffuse power of the local gentry and clerics who dominated counterrevolution in the eighteenth century. But even today, diffuse networks of brokers connected to the central government and functioning out of local government offices or business enterprises remain pivotal actors in the counterrevolutionary mobilizational process.

Nevertheless, effective counterrevolution capable of mobilizing large numbers requires more than selective incentives. Rather, societal cleavages (usually on the basis of class, ethnicity, religion, region, or clan) are needed to generate the passion and commitment that fuel largescale counterrevolutionary participation. As we have seen in a number of examples, groups that are in the minority in society and that have relied on the incumbent regime for safety or favored treatment are likely candidates to serve as reliable

[5]Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry 2011, 96; Youssef 2011.

bases of social support for counterrevolution--in large part due to their fear of retribution or attack against them that might accompany a shift in power.

As the literature on revolutions tells us (Goodwin 2001), autocratic regimes that rely primarily on patronage are the most vulnerable to overthrow by revolution precisely because of the problems of easier defection that they face. But defection for groups whose safety or position depends on the power of an incumbent regime is much more difficult. Claims by revolutionaries that they would protect minority interests are likely to lack credibility, and the uncertainties that accompany revolutionary government should cause minorities associated with an incumbent regime to consider defection a highly risky strategy. Accordingly, one might hypothesize that, in countering a revolutionary threat, counterrevolutionary mobilizations that rely more on deep societal divisions are likely to be more persistent and effective in marginalizing revolutionary oppositions than those that rely solely on hierarchical authority or material incentives.

The Social Sources of Counterrevolution in the 2004 Orange Revolution: Evidence from Two Surveys

As I have argued, most civilian counterrevolutionary mobilizations are composite in character, involving a mix of participation based on material incentives and participation based on societal divisions. In particular, the latter can be motivated primarily by fear of the power of the social forces represented by the revolutionary opposition than by loyalty to the incumbent regime. I examine these arguments in more detail through two highly unusual nationally-representative public opinion surveys taken at the time of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 that allow us to identify who mobilized in counterrevolutionary protests during the revolution and how they compare not only with

Orange Revolution participants and with the rest of Ukrainian society, but also with those who opposed the revolution but did not mobilize as counterrevolutionaries.

The Orange Revolution from November 21, 2004 through January 10, 2005 is widely considered one of the most spectacular displays of revolutionary protest on the European continent since the end of the Cold War. Up to a million citizens turned out on Maidan, the main square of Kyiv, in temperatures as cold as minus 12 degrees centigrade to call for the annulment of falsified elections and an end to the incumbent regime of Leonid Kuchma and his chosen successor, Viktor Yanukovych. Orange candidate Viktor Yushchenko was actually sworn in as president on Maidan in front of a large crowd of onlookers, even before the fraudulent electoral results declaring pro-incumbent candidate Viktor Yanukovych as winner were announced. There were several turning points in the making of the Orange Revolution: the defection of pro-Kuchma legislators in voting no-confidence in the Electoral Commission on November 27th (and later their dismissal of Yanukovych as Prime Minister on December 1st); the abandoned effort on November 28th by the regime to use force to gain back control over the situation, due in large part to defections from within the secret police and the armed forces; the remarkable display of independence by members of the Ukrainian Supreme Court on December 3rd to invalidate the elections, leading eventually to new elections that resolved the situation of dual power in favor of Yushchenko. But the Orange Revolution did not simply consist of protests aimed at overturning the Kuchma regime and its attempts to falsify elections. There were also numerous pro-incumbent demonstrations organized by the Yanukovych campaign. The largest of these attracted around 70 thousand participants and were concentrated in the east and south of the country.

Two public opinion surveys taken during and after the Orange Revolution allow us to gain some purchase on the prevalence of civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization in the revolution, as well as on who mobilized in counterrevolutionary protests. A nationally representative survey of 2,044 adults (18 or older) was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) from December 10-14, 2004--in the immediate wake of the protests but prior to the third and final round of the presidential vote (i.e., in the midst of the revolutionary crisis, and before its outcome was fully known). The survey asked respondents not only whether they had participated in demonstrations after the second round of voting, but also for whom they intended to vote in the upcoming third round of the election, which was to take place on December 26, 2004.[6] But assuming that those who voted for Yanukovych did not demonstrate for Yushchenko (and vice versa), in essence these questions allow one to identify five distinct groups with respect to the revolution (as depicted in Figure 1): 1) revolutionaries (those who intended to vote for Yushchenko in the third round of voting and who also participated in protests during the Orange Revolution: 13.6 percent of respondents); 2) revolution supporters (those who intended to vote for Yushchenko in the third round but did not participate in any demonstrations: 26.9 percent of respondents); 3) revolution opponents (those who intended to vote for pro-incumbent candidate Viktor Yanukovych or against all candidates in the third round but did not participate in protests: 35.7 percent of respondents); 4) counter-revolutionaries (those who participated in protest demonstrations but intended to vote for Yanukovych, against all candidates, or intended not to vote: 4.0 percent of respondents); and 5) the inactive or

[6]I use the third round of voting as the clearest expression of whether an individual supported or did not support the Yushchenko candidacy. The first round included numerous other candidates, and the second round occurred prior to the onset of the revolutionary events.

apathetic (those who, in the midst of the most hotly contested election in Ukrainian history and revolutionary events that swept up millions, did not participate in any protests and were undecided about their electoral preference: 18.6 percent of respondents).[7] Of course, given that the survey was taken prior to the third round of the presidential election, it may be a more accurate expression of who participated in the protests than of actual voting behavior (12.2 percent of the sample did not know at the time for whom they would vote or indicated no electoral preference). However, only 2.4 per cent of those who said that they participated in protests during the revolution indicated that they did not know for whom they would vote in the upcoming election.

[FIGURE 1 HERE]

The KIIS survey was a bare-bones survey focusing on voting and protest behavior during the revolution; it provides us with some basics demographics on voters and protestors and a few questions about attitudes toward the revolution. Its main advantage is that it occurred in the midst of the revolution and therefore is unlikely to suffer from problems of preference falsification, but it lacks the texture necessary to unpack counterrevolutionary mobilization in great detail. However, a second survey taken in March 2005, only two months after the conclusion of the revolution, provides a more nuanced picture of Ukrainian society during the Orange Revolution. The 2005 Monitoring survey was not designed specifically as a study of Orange Revolution participation. Monitoring surveys had been conducted by the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences

[7]A small portion (1.4 percent of the sample) refused to indicate whether they had voted in the presidential election or whether they had participated in any demonstrations. These respondents were dropped from the subsequent analysis. Another 1.7 percent was disqualified from voting and was also dropped from the subsequent analysis (Only 2 of these respondents indicated that they had participated in the Orange Revolution protests).

every year since 1994 as a means for analyzing trends within Ukrainian society (Panina 2005). The survey consisted of two parts: a battery of questions repeated annually, and one-time questions designed to probe particular issues of the day.[8] In the 2005 Monitoring survey, the particular series of one-time questions that was added concerned the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election and the Orange Revolution. Respondents were asked to identify the candidate for whom they voted in each of the three rounds of the 2004 presidential election and whether they had participated in any demonstrations during the Orange Revolution and in what manner. Again assuming that those who voted for Yanukovych did not demonstrate for Yushchenko (and vice versa), the questions allow one to identify five distinct groups with respect to the revolution (as depicted in Figure 2): 1) revolutionaries (those who reported voting for Yushchenko in the third round of voting and reported participating in protests during the Orange Revolution--18.6 percent of respondents); 2) revolution supporters (those who voted for Yushchenko in the third round but did not participate in any demonstrations--36.3 percent of respondents); 3) revolution opponents (those who voted for pro-incumbent candidate Viktor Yanukovych or voted against all candidates in the third round but did not participate in protests--31.5 percent of respondents); 4) counter-revolutionaries (those who participated in protest demonstrations but voted for Yanukovych, voted against all candidates, or willingly chose not vote--2.0 percent of respondents); and 5) the inactive or apathetic (those who, in the midst of one of the most hotly contested elections in Ukrainian history and revolutionary events that swept

[8]The March 2005 Monitoring survey was based on a representative sample of 1,801 adult Ukrainians (18 years or older) using a combination of stratified, random, and quota sampling and was conducted from March 2-30, 2005 in all provinces of Ukraine. For details on sampling procedures, see Panina 2005: 17-18.

up millions, neither voted nor participated in any protests--8.6 percent of respondents).[9]

[FIGURE 2 HERE]

The main advantage of the Monitoring survey over the KIIS survey is the level of detail about respondents that it provides. In all, the survey asked a total of 357 questions covering a wide variety of topics. In addition to questions about the respondent's age, gender, marital and family status, level of education, place of residence, religion, nationality, language use, and economic and material situation, the survey asked respondents about their attitudes toward privatization, Ukraine's geo-political orientation, citizenship and language policy, and political institutions. It asked about respondents' political self-identification, participation in civil society associations, trust in other people and in institutions, evaluations of political leaders, interactions with the state over the previous twelve months, attitudes toward various nationalities, their biggest fears and what they desired more in their lives, health and drinking habits, height and weight, the size of their living space and how well it was heated, how they spent their free time and what consumer goods they owned, thoughts of migration within Ukraine or abroad, access to the internet and cell-phone ownership, and numerous other questions.

But there are obvious issues with using any retrospective survey of participation in a revolution. Attitudes and beliefs may themselves be affected by the experience of revolution, and bandwagoning and preference falsification are inherent parts of the revolutionary process. The KIIS survey avoids these problems, given that it was taken in the

[9]A small portion (1.4 percent of the sample) refused to indicate whether they had voted in the presidential election or whether they had participated in any demonstrations. These respondents were dropped from the subsequent analysis. Another 1.7 percent was disqualified from voting and was also dropped from the subsequent analysis (Only 2 of these respondents indicated that they had participated in the Orange Revolution protests).

middle of the revolution. Moreover, the KIIS sample, conducted during the revolution, identifies a larger number of self-identified counterrevolutionaries (4.0 percent of the sample, or 82 individuals) compared with the Monitoring sample (only 2.0 percent of the sample, or 38 individuals). Clearly, one should feel more comfortable about findings based on the KIIS sample than the Monitoring sample, as generalizations based on a sample of only 38 individuals are suspect. Given these trade-offs (between the depth of questioning versus the size of the sample), my strategy is to compare the results of the two samples to see if they demonstrate similar patterns and findings in those areas in which they overlap, and only then to look to the broader range of questions represented in the Monitoring.

If one were to project the results of both surveys on Ukraine's adult population of 36 million, they would indicate that somewhere between 700 thousand and 1.4 million participated in counterrevolutionary protests in support of Yanukovych and the incumbent regime across various parts of Ukraine. That represents a relatively high level of counterrevolutionary mobilization, even though it was significantly smaller than the revolutionary mobilization against which it was oriented. Both surveys show, however, that while more Ukrainians supported the revolution than opposed it, Ukrainian society was much more closely divided over regime-change than the differences in turnout between revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries would suggest. The official electoral results of the third round of voting indicated that Yushchenko supporters outnumbered Yushchenko opponents on the order of about 6 to 5; the Monitoring survey records a margin of 8 to 5, while the KIIS survey showed a very narrow margin of 11 to 10 among likely voters. Nevertheless, protest mobilization among revolution supporters far outnumbered mobilization by revolution opponents (by a factor of almost 9 to 1 in the Monitoring survey,

and in the KIIS survey by a factor of almost 4 to 1). According to the KIIS survey, only 51 percent of Yushchenko voters who did not participate in protests knew someone (a friend, relative, or acquaintance) who participated in a protest during the revolution; by contrast, only 18 percent of Yanukovych voters did. Thus, even in "successful" revolutions like the Orange Revolution (i.e., revolutions in which the opposition is able to attain power), preferences toward the incumbent regime are usually much more deeply divided than visible patterns of collective action suggest. Furthermore, the outcomes of successful revolutions may be due as much to the relative passivity of potential regime supporters as to the effective mobilization of regime opponents.

What do the two samples tell us about the nature of counterrevolutionary mobilization? Table 1 shows a number of demographic features of counterrevolutionary participants across the two samples, placing them into comparative perspective relative to the Ukrainian population as a whole, to the Yanukovych supporters from which they were recruited, and to the Orange revolutionaries against whom they mobilized. A number of interesting patterns stand out. For one thing, in terms of gender, both samples demonstrate that counterrevolutionaries were more male than the Ukrainian population or Yanukovych voters as a whole, though the differences are more apparent in the Monitoring sample than in the KIIS sample (where gender differences are not statistically significant). In terms of age, both surveys show that counter-revolutionaries tended to be older and more middle-aged than revolutionaries, but nevertheless younger than either the Ukrainian population or Yanukovych voters as a whole (The differences are statistically significant in the large KIIS sample). Moreover, according to the KIIS survey, 31 percent of counterrevolutionaries had a higher education (considerably more than Yanukovych voters as a whole (14 percent) and at about the same level as those who participated in the pro-

Yushchenko protests in Orange Revolution participants (33 percent).[10] Similar patterns appear in the smaller but less reliable Monitoring survey. Thus, the notion that counterrevolutionaries were uneducated or consisted primarily of "thugs" is clearly contradicted by the surveys. Rather, both revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries consisted disproportionately of those with higher education. Given that education is often associated with the cognitive skills necessary for mobilization (Inglehart 1990), and that in most societies the educated participate disproportionately in protest, the fact that education is associated with participation in both revolution and counterrevolution makes logical sense, though it defies stereotypes about counterrevolution.

[Table 1 here]

At the same time, it is also clear from the surveys that there were multiple dimensions--programmatic, cultural, and clientelistic--to the recruitment of counterrevolutionaries during the Orange Revolution. For example, in the KIIS survey 42 percent of counterrevolutionaries (as opposed to only 11 percent of Yanukovych voters) fully agreed with the statement that it was necessary to protest in order to defend their vote for president. Indeed, counterrevolutionaries were much more committed to Yanukovych as a candidate than Yanukovych voters as a whole. When asked in the KIIS survey for whom they would vote if Yanukovych dropped out of the race, 77 percent of counterrevolutionaries indicated that they would vote against all the other candidates or not vote at all, as opposed to only 58 percent of Yanukovych voters as a whole (statistically significant at the .05 level). In addition to being more educated than Yanukovych voters or the Ukrainian population, for the most part counterrevolutionaries were not one-time

[10]Indeed, as shown below in Figure 3, even controlling for gender, age, and nationality, counterrevolutionaries were more than twice as likely as either Yanukovych supporters or the Ukrainian population as a whole to have had a higher education.

activists; 51 percent indicated that they had participated in earlier political meetings or demonstrations during the past 12 months (as opposed to 14 percent of the Ukrainian population and only 2 percent of Yanukovych voters as a whole). In fact, counterrevolutionaries were about as politically active in the prior year leading up to the revolution as were revolutionaries participating in pro-Yushchenko protests--68 percent of whom had participated in early political meetings or demonstrations during the previous year. Counterrevolutionaries also had some clearer opinions on a number of public policy issues relative to other groupings. They were more likely to say that they supported socialism over capitalism (47 percent) compared to either Yanukovych supporters (30 percent) or the Ukrainian population as a whole (25 percent), more like to oppose the privatization of land (71 percent) compared to Yanukovych supporters (55 percent) or the Ukrainian population as a whole (57 percent), and more likely to identify themselves as communists (21 percent) than either Yanukovych supporters (13 percent) or the Ukrainian population as a whole (7 percent).[11] Again, this hardly fits the image of a politically apathetic mass manipulated by selective incentives and points to at least an element of counterrevolutionary mobilization bearing a programmatic character.

[FIGURE 3 HERE]

At the same time, both the KIIS and the Monitoring surveys provide some highly suggestive evidence of a patronage basis among a significant number of counterrevolutionaries. According to the KIIS survey, 59 percent of counterrevolutionaries came from a single province: Donetsk province--Yanukovych's home base, where he was born, where he built his political career, and where he received the second-highest level of

[11]All these differences are statistically significant at the .05 level or better.

electoral support (after Lugansk province).[12] By contrast, only 21 percent of Yanukovych voters as a whole came from Donetsk province (a difference that is statistically significant at the .001 level). As can be seen in Figure 3, this regional difference holds up even when one controls for the gender, age, nationality, and education of respondents. Controlling for other factors, the odds of a counterrevolutionary coming from Donetsk province were four times greater than the odds of a Yanukovych voter coming from Donetsk province, and eleven times greater than a Ukrainian citizen coming from Donetsk province.

The Monitoring data provides some further insights into the personalities and lifestyles of counterrevolutionaries that suggest that patronage may have played an important role in mobilizing a significant group of counterrevolutionaries. As can be seen in Figure 4, on average the odds that a counterrevolutionary was dissatisfied with the amenities and sanitary conditions of his or her home were considerably greater than for other groupings: 130 percent greater than for Yanukovych voters, 654 percent greater than pro-Yushchenko Orange Revolution participants, and 258 percent greater than a random member of the Ukrainian population. Moreover, the odds that a counterrevolutionary engaged in physical exercise sometime in the last seven days were also considerably greater than for other groups: 173 percent greater than for Yanukovych supporters in general, 158 percent greater than pro-Yushchenko Orange Revolution participants, and 181 percent greater than a random member of the Ukrainian population. Counterrevolutionaries were significantly more likely to say that they were in good health, to believe that people are fundamentally dishonest, to lack trust in religious authority, and to believe themselves to be

[12]Indeed, 71 percent of counterrevolutionaries came from the Donbass provinces of Donetsk and Lugansk (with another 9 percent from Crimea and 5 percent from Kharkov). In short, counterrevolutionaries were almost entirely recruited from four out of Ukraine's 25 provinces.

decisive than the Ukrainian population as a whole, Yanukovych supporters, or Orange revolutionaries. They also drank alcohol more regularly than both Yanukovych supporters and the rest of the Ukrainian population and were more likely to smoke than the Ukrainian population as a whole.[13] In other words, compared to other groupings and to the Ukrainian population, counterrevolutionaries tended to be more materially dissatisfied, more irreverent, more distrustful of others, more often intoxicated, and more physically fit. Such patterns might be compatible with what we might expect from a "thuggish" theory of counterrevolution, though some elements certainly defy the stereotype.

[FIGURE 4 HERE]

There were also large cultural differences between counter-revolutionaries and the rest of the Ukrainian population, with mobilization fueled in part by fear of what a change in power might mean for Russians and Russian-speakers. For example, 35 percent of counterrevolutionaries were ethnic Russians (compared to 31 percent of Yanukovych supporters more generally, but only 17 percent of the rest of the Ukrainian population and 5 percent of pro-Yushchenko Orange Revolution participants). Moreover, only 7 percent considered Ukrainian their native language (as opposed to 23 percent of Yanukovych supporters as a whole, 65 percent of the rest of the population, and 83 percent of pro-Yushchenko Orange Revolution participants). They were also much less likely to consider Ukraine their motherland and more likely to believe that they were lacking opportunities to learn about their own culture than either Yanukovych voters, Orange Revolution supporters, or the Ukrainian population as a whole.[14] In short, fears of a minority losing its favored position as a result of revolution helped to drive an important element of Ukrainian

[13]All these differences are statistically significant at the .05 level or better.
[14]Again, all these findings are statistically significant to at least the .05 level.

counterrevolutionary mobilization--as we have seen, a pattern repeatedly evident over the last two centuries.

The Composite Character of Counterrevolution in the Orange Revolution

To examine further the composite nature of counterrevolutionary mobilization in the Orange Revolution, I performed a latent class cluster analysis on the KIIS sample of counterrevolutionaries. Latent class cluster analysis is a finite mixture approach used to identify groupings of individuals who share similar interests, values, characteristics, or behaviors. Individuals are classified into clusters based upon the probabilities of their membership, which (unlike traditional k-means cluster analysis) are estimated directly from the model. Moreover, unlike traditional k-means clustering, latent class cluster variables can be continuous, nominal, or ordinal.[15] My expectation was to find that the social sources of counterrevolution in the Orange Revolution clustered into a few key groupings that were also associated with different attitudes and relationships to the incumbent regime.

Although the Monitoring sample provided a richer array of potential clustering variables, the small sample size (n=38) inhibited any credible attempt at clustering. The KIIS sample, by contrast, contained a limited number of variables but a sample size of counterrevolutionaries (n=82) large enough to have some confidence in the results. My strategy was to identify clusters of counterrevolutionaries in the KIIS sample according to the region from which they hailed and self-ascribed cultural characteristics (specifically, ethnicity and language use), and then to test to see whether these clusters corresponded with different attitudinal orientations to the extent that these were measured in the KIIS

[15]See Vermunt and Magidson, 2002. Latent Gold 4.5.0 was used to perform the analyses.

survey. Luckily, there were several questions in the KIIS survey that asked respondents about their attitudes toward current events that allow us to test whether clusters of counterrevolutionaries differed in more than just a demographic sense. Respondents were asked, for example, why they thought people were protesting (respondents could choose up to two reasons from a set list), whether they believed that electoral fraud had taken place in the second round of presidential voting and Yanukovych should be considered the legitimate president, and whether they supported preserving public order at any price (This latter question in essence measured a respondent's willingness to support a violent crackdown against Orange revolution participants). For the question on why people were protesting, two of the responses frequently chosen by Orange revolutionaries received practically no support from counterrevolutionaries: that people were protesting because of electoral fraud, and that people were protesting in support of Viktor Yushchenko. Rather, counterrevolutionaries believed that people were protesting either because they were paid money to do so (35 percent), because they supported Viktor Yanukovych (23 percent), to express their attitudes toward the authorities (12 percent), or to support a just democratic society (12 percent). While we cannot be certain, these answers seemed to imply that respondents were describing their own motivations for participation rather than the motivations of other groupings, though the way that the question is worded, one cannot be certain. I used the answers to these questions to test whether counterrevolutionaries were divided in their opinions about the revolution, and if so, whether these divisions corresponded with specific demographic clusters.

An initial 5-variable model based on a combination of region, ethnicity, and language performed a reasonable job fitting the data into clusters, producing an R-square value of

.93.[16] I used the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to adjudicate between models with different numbers of clusters (Fonseca 2008, Andrews and Currim 2003), with the lowest BIC (439.03) suggesting a three-cluster model over the two-cluster or four-cluster alternatives. Figure 5 presents the cluster profile plot for the three clusters of counterrevolutionaries identified by the model. I have labeled the three clusters: 1) Donbass[17] Russian language only (comprising 50 percent of counterrevolutionaries); 2) Donbass dual language (comprising 30 percent of counterrevolutionaries); and 3) Southern[18] (comprising 20 percent of counterrevolutionaries).[19] Not unexpectedly, these also happened to be the regions that almost a decade later, in the wake of the Euromaidan Revolution, attempted to secede from Ukraine. The Russian language only contingent of counterrevolutionaries from the Donbass and the counterrevolutionaries from the south included among them a large number of ethnic Russians, though the southern contingent was the most diverse of the three clusters in terms of language usage. As this breakdown suggests, one of the reasons for the failure of counterrevolution during the Orange Revolution was its limited regional reach: the regime was simply unable to mobilize large numbers outside the Donbass region.

[16]The bootstrapped p-value of L-squared (.526) and the dissimilarity index (.84) also suggest a reasonable fit. See Vermunt and Magidson 2002. All of the five variables included in the model were statistically significant at the .05 level, with the exception of the dummy variable for southern regions, which was statistically significant at the .10 level. Out of the 82 counterrevolutionaries in the KIIS sample, there were four counterrevolutionaries who came from central Ukraine and four who came from Kharkov province--groups that were too small to constitute separate clusters, but that nevertheless weakened the statistical significance of the southern dummy.

[17]Donbass is defined as Donetsk and Lugansk provinces.

[18]Southern provinces consist of Crimea, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozh'e, Nikolaev, Odessa, and Kherson. Half of Southern counterrevolutionaries came from Crimea.

[19]As the profile plot indicates, 80 percent of the Southern cluster came from southern Ukrainian provinces; the remainder consisted of the scattered counterrevolutionaries located elsewhere in Ukraine outside the Donbass.

[FIGURE 5 HERE]

As can be seen in Figure 6, the two Donbass clusters of counterrevolutionaries demonstrated some sharply different attitudes toward the ongoing events in the Orange Revolution compared to the Southern cluster. When asked why people were protesting in the revolution, Donbass counterrevolutionaries, irrespective of whether they spoke Russian only or had dual-language capability, overwhelmingly replied that they were protesting in order to support Yanukovych, while Southern counterrevolutionaries disproportionately responded that people were protesting in order to defend the values of a just democratic society (though were also slightly more likely than the Russian-speaking Donbass contingent to indicated that people were protesting because they were paid money). The two Donbass clusters refused to recognize that any electoral fraud had occurred in the second round of the presidential vote and believed that Yanukovych was the legitimate president of Ukraine. By contrast, the Southern counterrevolutionaries by and large did not support this position. The Donbass clusters also were much more supportive of preserving public order at any cost (i.e., supporting a crackdown against revolutionaries) than were the Southern counterrevolutionaries. In short, as one might expect, counterrevolutionaries from the Donbass, where local patronage ties were more evident, were overwhelmingly committed to Yanukovych personally and were willing to accept a violent crackdown against opponents in order to ensure his power, whereas the bases for Southern counterrevolution were more diverse, more policy-driven, and less committed to Yanukovych personally.

[FIGURE 6 HERE]

Conclusion

As we have seen, civilian counterrevolutionary mobilization is an integral part of revolutionary processes and has been since the invention of modern revolution in the 17th century. It has served a variety of purposes for incumbent regimes. It can demonstrate the continuing power of the regime to control institutions and command popular support, raising the costs of defection. It can be used as a tool of repression in place of the police or the military, thereby preserving the morale of the regime's institutions of order, rendering backlash mobilization against repression more difficult, and justifying a deeper crackdown through the imposition of a state of emergency. And it can visibly demonstrate the limits of support for revolutionary opposition within society, undermining revolutionary claims to popular legitimacy.

Counterrevolutionary mobilization has evolved over time much as revolution itself has. It has become much more integrated into the state and into bureaucratic organization, more urban and less rural, and (as was evident during the Orange Revolution) more educated. But certain features seem to persist over time as well. Counterrevolutionary mobilization has tended to be composite, consisting of a variety of societal segments mobilized along programmatic, cultural, and patronage lines that are relatively decentralized and not well integrated. Selective incentives usually play some role, especially in recruiting muscle. But larger and more persistent counterrevolutionary mobilizations require tapping into deeper societal cleavages that provide a basis for more autonomous counterrevolutionary mobilizations. Clearly, those privileged under an incumbent regime or who share its ideology have particular reason to mobilize in its support. But we have also seen repeatedly that counterrevolutionary mobilizations often tap cultural minorities who fear the consequences that a shift to majority power resulting from revolutionary change

might have on their safety and position in society. Such divisions serve as a more reliable base of support for counterrevolution than clientelistic ties, for they make defection much more difficult.

In an age in which successful revolution has come to depend upon the power of numbers (DeNardo 1985), effective counterrevolutionary mobilization (in the sense of successfully contributing to the defense of an incumbent regime) has increasingly relied on tapping into large numbers as well. Societies experiencing revolutions are usually much more deeply divided over the incumbent regime that revolutionary narratives admit. Nevertheless, much counterrevolutionary mobilization fails in its purpose of regime defense, in large part because it is limited in scope, reach, and commitment. Such was the case, for instance, in the Orange Revolution, which was predominantly confined to the Donbass region, relied significantly on patronage relations for mobilization, and had difficulty projecting itself outside of Yanukovych's home base. Part of any complete explanation for the success of the Orange Revolution (at least in terms of capturing power) must reference the weakness of the counterrevolutionary forces that it encountered. In this sense, successful revolution involves not merely the effective mobilization of regime opponents, but the relative passivity and demobilization of regime supporters as well.

References

Allen, Thomas B. 2010. *Tories: Fighting for the King in America's First Civil War*. New York: Harper.

Andrews, Rick L. and Currim, Imran S. (2003). "Retention of Latent Segments in Regression Based Marketing Models." *International Journal of Research in Marketing* 20, 4: 315 321.

Atwal, M. and Bacon, Edwin. 2012. "The Youth Movement Nashi: Contentious Politics, Civil Society, and Party Politics." *East European Politics* 28, 3: 256-266.

Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. 2011. "Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, December 10, 2011." Manama, Bahrain (at http://files.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf).

Barany, Zoltan. 2013. "Armies and Revolutions." *Journal of Democracy* 24, 2: 62-76.

Beissinger, Mark R. 2002. *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Benford, Robert, and David A. Snow. 2000. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26: 611-39.

Brown, Wallace. 1965. *The King's Friends: The Composition ad Motives of the American Loyalist Claimants*. Providence, RI: Brown University Press.

DeNardo, James. 1985. *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion*. Princeton University Press.

Fonseca, Jaime R. S. 2008. "The Application of Mixture Modeling and Information Criteria for Discovering Patterns of Coronary Heart Disease." *Journal of Applied Quantitative Methods* 3, 4: 292 303.

Golkar, Saeid. 2015. *Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Iran*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

Goodwin, Jeff. 2001. *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Gould, Roger V. 1995. *Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the Commune*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. "Values, Ideology and Cognitive Mobilization in New Social Movements." In Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler, eds., *Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies*. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press: 43-66.

Javeline, Debra. 2003. “The Role of Blame in Collective Action: Evidence from Russia.” *American Political Science Review* 97, 1: 107-121.

Jundzis, Tālavs. 2009. “The Role of Non-Violent Resistance in the Struggle to Achieve Full Independence (4 May 1990-21 August 1991).” In Valdis Blūzma, Tālavs Jundzis, Jānis Riekstiņš, Gene Sharp, and Heinrihs Strods, eds. *Regaining Independence: Non-Violent Resistance in Latvia, 1945-1991*. Riga, Latvia: Latvian Academy of Sciences: 532-598.

Ketchley, Neil. 2016. “Elite-led Protest and Authoritarian State Capture in Egypt.” Paper presented at the Oxford-POMEPS Conference "From Mobilizaiton to Counter-Revolution: The Arab Spring in Comparative Perspective," Oxford University, Oxford, UK.

Ketchley, Neil. 2014. "“The Army and the People are One Hand!” Fraternization and the 25th January Egyptian Revolution." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, 1: 155-186.

Kuran, Timur. 1997. *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Langer, Jacob. 2007. “Corruption and the Counterrevolution: The Rise and Fall of the Black Hundred.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University (located at http://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10161/438/D_Langer_Jacob_a_200712.pdf?sequence=1).

Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1987. “Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (June): 266-297.

Marx, Karl, 1978. “The Class Struggles in France: 1848 to 1850,” in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works, vol. 10*. New York: International Publishers: 45-145.

Mayer, Arno J. 2000. *The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

O'Brien, Kevin J. and Lianjiang Li. 2006. *Rightful Resistance in Rural China*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Panina, Natalya. 2005. *Ukrainian Society 1994-2005: Sociological Monitoring*. Kyiv: International Center for Policy Studies.

Pincas, Steven. 2014. *1688: The First Modern Revolution*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Radnitz, Scott. 2010. *Weapons of the Wealthy: Predatory Regimes and Elite-led Protests in Central Asia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Robertson, Graeme B. 2009. “Managing Society: Protest, Civil Society, and Regime in Putin's Russia.” *Slavic Review* 68, 3: 528–47.

Scott, James C. 1990. *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Senn, Alfred Erich. 1995. *Gorbachev’s Failure in Lithuania*. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Slater, Dan, and Nicholas Rush Smith. 2016. "The Power of Counterrevolution: Elitist Origins of Political Order in Postcolonial Asia and Africa 1." *American Journal of Sociology* 121, 5: 1472-1516.

Sutherland, D. M. G. 1986. *France 1789-1815: Revolution and Counterrevolution*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Tarek, Sharif. 2011. "Bosses, Enforcers and Thugs in Egypt's Battle of the Camel to See Harsh Retribution." *Ahramonline*, April 19 (at http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/10293/Egypt/Politics-/Bosses,-enforcers-and-thugs-in-Egypts-Battle-of-th.aspx).

Tilly, Charles. 1989. “State and Counterrevolution in France.” *Social Research* 56, 1: 71–97

Tilly, Charles. 1964. *The Vendée*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Traugott, Mark. 1980. "Determinants of Political Orientation: Class and Organization in the Parisian Insurrection of June 1848." *American Journal of Sociology*, 86, 1:. 32-49.

Traugott, Mark. 1985. *Armies of the Poor: Determinants of Working-Class Participation in the Parisian Insurrection of June 1848*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Vermunt, Jeroen K. and Magidson, Jay. 2002. “Latent Class Cluster Analysis.” In J. A. Hagenaars and A. L. McCutcheon, eds., *Applied Latent Class Analysis*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press: 88-106.

Weiss, Jessica Chen. 2013. "Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China." *International Organization* 67, 1: 1-35.

Weyland, Kurt. 2016. “Crafting Counterrevolution: How Reactionaries Learned to Combat Change in 1848.” *American Political Science Review* 110, 2: 215-231.

Youssef, Nancy A. 2011. "Huge Bahraini Counter-Protest Reflects Rising Sectarian Strife." *McClatchyDC*, February 21 (at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article24612922.html).

Table 1. The Demography of Counter-Revolution in Ukraine, 2004

	KIIS Survey (December 2004)					Monitoring Survey (March 2005)			
	Sample as a whole	Counter-revolutionaries	Yanukovych supporters	Orange revolutionaries		Sample as a whole	Counter-revolutionaries	Yanukovych supporters	Orange revolutionaries
n	2,044	82	729	277		1,800	38	567	335
Male	44.7%	45.7%	42.6%	48.4%		44.3%	63.2%	41.3%	54.3%
Ages 35 or younger	31.1%	34.2%	28.3	41.9%		33.8%	39.5%	33.0%	42.4%
Ages 36-55	36.4%	42.7%	33.5%	44.0%		36.8%	34.2%	34.2%	37.3%
Ages 56 or older	32.5%	23.2%	38.3%	14.1%		29.4%	26.3%	32.8%	20.3%
Median age	46	44	49	39		45	40.5	47	40
Higher education	18.7%	30.5%	14.1%	33.2%		11.2%	15.8%	9.5%	16.1%
Russian nationality	17.5%	35.4%	30.7%	4.7%		17.4%	34.2%	31.5%	3.9%
Claims Russian as native language	26.4%	59.2%	45.1%	7.4%		--	--	--	--
Speaks only Russian at home	--	--	--	--		36.4%	65.8%	64.3%	10.2%
Donetsk province	10.7%	58.5%	20.6%	0.4%		10.4%	36.8%	24.3%	0%
Other Eastern provinces	11.6%	18.3%	22.1%	1.8%		11.9%	18.4%	23.1%	3.3%
Southern provinces	26.5%	17.1%	39.9%	8.7%		26.8%	7.9%	39.0%	6.3%

Figure 1: Political Groupings in the Orange Revolution (KIIS Survey)



Figure 2: Political Groupings in the Orange Revolution (Monitoring Survey)



Figure 3. Factors Affecting Counterrevolutionary Participation (KIIS data) (logistic regression)



Figure 4. Factors Associated With Counterrevolutionary Participation (Monitoring Survey) (logistic regression)



Figure 5. Profile Plot for Three-Cluster Model of Counterrevolutionaries in the Orange Revolution



Figure 6. Attitudinal Profile Plot for Three Clusters of Counterrevolutionaries in the Orange Revolution