

HONG KONG'S PLACE IN THE WORLD: SOCIAL COHESION THROUGH GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY

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Abstract:

This paper is meant to act as the theoretical framework for an on-going study concerning Hong Kong's popular attitudes towards global responsibility.

The study hypothesizes that Hong Kong should think globally in their efforts to improve social cohesion locally. More specifically, this paper will seek to show that by adopting a more visible, globally responsible external policy, Hong Kong can enhance local cohesion by (1) increasing local pride in the uniqueness of what the Hong Kong community has to offer the nation and the world; (2) by strengthening the confidence of Hong Kong people in their leaders; (3) and by transferring lessons and experiences about how to enhance inclusivity and sustainability from the global level to the Hong Kong community. Hence, it argues that a pro-active external agenda focusing on global responsibility will strengthen the bonds between Hong Kong people and the government, and among the people themselves.

In putting forth this argument, the paper also attempts to refute potential critics who may argue that encouraging Hong Kong's global moral obligation will weaken the obligations felt towards the Chinese nation or that globally responsible agendas have little salience for the Hong Kong people. It will seek to demonstrate that expanding Hong Kong's radius of responsibility to the global level will not only contribute to national objectives, but that this avenue of building local social cohesion will act as a hedge against the likelihood that cohesion in Hong Kong will come at the expense of cohesion at the national or global level. It also argues that Hong Kong people would not only support a globally responsible agenda, but that this agenda has the potential to be a significant source of pride.

Developing an effective communal bond when we live in a world where political communities are continually contested is no easy task. Hong Kong's international personality has always been an important part of what makes it unique. Capitalizing on this asset by adopting a more visible and globally responsible external agenda will help strengthen local pride of place by demonstrating Hong Kong's important contribution to national and international stability and prosperity.

The Challenge: Strengthening cohesion while expanding Hong Kong's "Radius of Trust"¹

What is special about Hong Kong? What is to prevent Hong Kong people from "voting with their feet" when the next major crisis hits? How can Hong Kong's leaders persuade its citizens that Hong Kong is a place to continue to invest in now and for future generations? Why should Hong Kong people work together for the good of the whole? This paper is premised on the idea that a more socially cohesive Hong Kong requires the development of a compelling vision of what Hong Kong stands for. The paper argues that a legitimate and principled community identity is necessary if people are to act in spite of individual interests or in spite of differences in background, creed, and political beliefs for the good of the whole community. Such an identity will enhance Hong Kong's communal sense of purpose and pride of place. This shared purpose and pride will, in turn, help bond Hong Kong people together to withstand the inevitable challenges inherent in our highly interdependent and globalized world.

Can Hong Kong develop an effective communal bond when we live in a world where political communities are continually contested? This is not an easy task since individuals are typically grappling with how to prioritize loyalties felt towards a wide diversity of local, national and global identities. As Anthony Smith describes, in the modern (or post-modern) era, "we have already seen that sociologically, human beings have multiple identities [and that] they can move between them according to context and situation."² Even political legitimacy at the nation-state level, the political community which for most of this past century claimed the monopoly on political allegiances, is under tremendous pressure. On the one hand, the state's *raison d'être* is being questioned as the result of its inability to effectively address an increasing array of transnational social, environmental and security threats from above. On the other hand, individuals are questioning their political allegiance to the state as an increasing number of ethnic, religious, and cultural ties compete for their primary allegiance from below.

The populations of Hong Kong are living in a time where people have the ability to "freely choose a personal identity constructed out of a broad array of building blocks."³ This doesn't simply refer to the global "elite" who are geographically mobile, enjoy multiple citizenships, and can work all over the world, but also to the growing number of residents who lack this personal mobility but who have turned to international educational and investment strategies as a hedge against the risk of local economic or political failure.⁴ Legitimate questions arise about whether the impacts of the contingent political loyalties which can accompany such strategies have the

¹ This notion is used by Francis Fukuyama ("Social Capital, Civil Society and Development." *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 22, No. 1, 2001) who borrows it from Lawrence Harrison (*Underdevelopment is a State of Mind*, 1985).

² Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity," *International Affairs*, Vol 68, No. 1 Jan., 1992), 55-76

³ Thomas M. Franck, "Clan and Superclan: Loyalty, Identity, and Community in Law and Practice," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 90, No. 3 (Jul. 1996), p. 359.

⁴ Michael Hill, "Citizenship and Social Closure: Predetermined and Post Modern Trajectories," *Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 31, Issue 1, 2003.

potential to eat away at local community bonds. How do HK's political leaders inculcate a stronger sense of local pride, for example, when they have to compete for attention against loyalties towards legitimate Chinese nationalist or international humanitarian causes?

Analyzing Hong Kong's level of social cohesion can also be rather problematic as a result of antiquated political tendencies, such as a residual colonial mentality (which repressed collective political identity), an overemphasis on individualism (which emphasized economic gain at the expense of political cohesion) and high levels of geographical mobility (which obstructed the development of strong local loyalties). While "social capital is what permits individuals to band together to defend their interests and organize to support collective needs", Hong Kong's residual authoritarian structures "thrive[d] on social atomization."⁵ While the majority of the population in Hong Kong is Cantonese, in face of these structural obstacles, it is not surprising that Hong Kong society is not as cohesive as its ethnic composition would imply.

One can also point to traditional Chinese family values to help explain the nature of social cohesion in Hong Kong. Observers, such as Francis Fukuyama, have pointed out those Chinese communities which posit allegiances to family and clan above all else have a very narrow "radius of trust" which discourages cooperation and trust among members of the larger community.

"A deficit of trust toward outsiders means that one's strongest relationships of trust are reserved for family and close friends, creating the cultural conditions for a two-tiered moral system in which one feels few compunctions in behaving opportunistically toward others. Under these cultural conditions, a politician elected to public office, for example, often feels a positive obligation to pad his accounts on behalf of his family, or to promote family and clients over more qualified people chosen by objective criteria. Much of the crisis of political corruption from which Latin American countries suffer is grounded in this kind of two-tiered moral structure."⁶

This narrow radius of trust in traditional Chinese communities was exacerbated by the lack of "principled" political legitimacy under the British. While one could argue that the British colonial administration maintained a relatively high level of performance legitimacy, one could also argue that it failed in providing a principled rationale for its authority. What prestige for Hong Kong people is there in being associated with a Western colonial government? With the resumption of Chinese sovereignty, a similar question is often posed: what prestige is there for Hong Kong residents in being simply another Chinese city?

So, communal loyalty and pride of place demand more than government promises of economic performance. They demand a principled political vision in which people can believe. This is especially important for Hong Kong given its democratic

⁵ Francis Fukuyama, "Social Capital and Development: The Coming Agenda," *SAIS Review* 22.1 (2002) 23-37.

⁶ *Ibid.*

political aspirations within the “One Country, Two Systems” framework. As Charles Taylor has pointed out, a “democracy can only work if most of its members are convinced that their political society is a common venture of considerable moment, and believe it to be of vital importance that they participate in the ways that they must to keep it functioning as a democracy.”⁷ This communal purpose will go a long way towards dissolving “the hold that lesser forms of group loyalty...[impose] on the human mind by subsuming these lesser loyalties under an allegiance to the larger [Hong Kong] community.”⁸

Yet, thinking about effective levels of social cohesion is further complicated by the fact that a highly cohesive society is not necessarily a good thing, if, as Fukuyama notes, “group solidarity ...is purchased at the price of hostility towards out group members.”⁹ If the people of Hong Kong were to exclusively emphasize what is unique and special about Hong Kong vis-à-vis the Mainland; to prominently highlight the need for “heunggong yahn” to come before “zhongguo ren”; or to accentuate the “Two System” part of the Basic Law framework at the expense of its balance with the “One Country” side of the scale, then the cohesiveness between Hong Kong residents and the Chinese nation may be inadvertently jeopardized. At the same time, if Chinese national identity is the primary source of collective loyalty, it may alienate important members of Hong Kong’s non-Chinese local community, and inadvertently contribute to jingoistic sentiment in Hong Kong and the mainland which may indirectly threaten regional peace or stability. Moreover, if the “One Country” part of Hong Kong’s identity becomes dominant, people may lose confidence in the relevance and legitimacy of Hong Kong’s local government as “special” in the wider context of China. Thus, maintaining a proper balance between local, national and global allegiances seems crucial.

The task of developing a framework for inculcating a community identity which combines a strong sense of national political (not only cultural) identity (to insure that Hong Kong is a seamless and coherent part of the PRC) with local pride of place is arduous. Such a framework needs to insure that these identities are not in opposition, but complementary and mutually beneficially – working for the good of the nation and the territory. This paper will argue that a vision of Hong Kong’s purpose which expands Hong Kong’s radius of responsibility beyond the local and national to include the global could act as a cornerstone for a socially cohesive Hong Kong which does not come at the expense of national or international community identity. (see the graphical image of this link on the last page of this paper.) Of course, Hong Kong’s vision of its role in the world is only one piece of Hong Kong’s communal identity, but effectively incorporating a vision of what Hong Kong can contribute to

⁷ Charles Taylor, “Why Democracy Needs Patriotism,” *Boston Review*, Volume 15, Number 5, 1994.

⁸ While Harris here is talking about cohesion at the national level, the same could be said of challenges faced by the Hong Kong community. Lee Harris, “The Cosmopolitan Illusion,” *Policy Review*, No. 118, April and May 2003.

⁹ Francis Fukuyama, “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development.” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 22, No. 1, 2001, p. 8.

make the world a better place has the potential to an important source of normative glue for social cohesion in Hong Kong.

What is a globally responsible external agenda?

When talking about global responsibilities, Hong Kong, being a dependent territory as a Special Administrative region of China which had been ruled by the British as a colony until 1997, presents an interesting case. Hong Kong's uniqueness and survival has been linked with its special international status and extensive global linkages. The legal arrangements for Hong Kong's transition from a British colony to a Chinese Special Administrative Region in the form of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law provided the constitutional basis for the articulation of its aspiration to project the city's presence and voice in the world. Yet, with Hong Kong's colonial past, Chinese cultural heritage and social and economic linkages with different parts of the world, the international identity of the population is multiple in nature and somewhat ambiguous.¹⁰

While acknowledging that there are legitimate differences on how to define globally responsible policies and Hong Kong's role therein, this paper will argue that Hong Kong can and should adopt globally responsible external policies in which Hong Kong acknowledges its obligations to global humanity, by promoting cooperation, sustainability and economic inclusivity at the international level.¹¹

More specifically, a globally responsible agenda acknowledges that Hong Kong's current high levels of global interdependence makes the global arena more relevant in our lives than ever before. Civil war, for example, in a neighboring country may lead to flows of refugees into Hong Kong. A currency crisis in one country may indirectly destabilize Hong Kong's own financial situation. Televised images of prosperity and comfort from a neighboring country may add to the pressure on the Hong Kong government to provide similar qualities of life opportunities for its own citizens.

A globally responsible agenda would also acknowledge that Hong Kong or even China can no longer act alone to protect its members from a growing number of international threats, including pollution, disease, transnational organized crime, large scale refugee flows, climate change, or international financial instability. Problems such as these require international cooperation and compromise to effect a change.

¹⁰ Gerard A Postiglione and James T H Tang with Ting Wai, "Transforming Hong Kong's Global Identity", introductory chapter in G.A. Postiglione and J.T.H. Tang, *Hong Kong's Reunion with China* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp.3-19

¹¹ The UN Global Compact is one such vision of global responsibility, albeit largely targeted at the private sector. "In an address to The World Economic Forum on 31 January 1999, United Nation Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenged business leaders to join an international initiative – the Global Compact. Through the power of collective action, the Global Compact seeks to advance responsible corporate citizenship so that business can be part of the solution to the challenges of globalisation. In this way, the private sector – in partnership with other social actors – can help realize...a more sustainable and inclusive global economy." From www.unglobalcompact.org.

Furthermore, a globally responsible agenda acknowledges that the massive concentration of global poverty in the “global south”, a region which has 80% of the world’s population but only 20% of the wealth, is unsustainable and threatening to global stability. While we may not agree on how to address the complexity of problems which lead to these disparities, a globally responsible agenda acknowledges that we have a moral obligation to try.

This paper argues that it is not enough for Hong Kong simply to be an active participant in international economic forums or regional political discussions, but that Hong Kong’s engagement with a global agenda would enhance social cohesion domestically. Hong Kong should distinguish itself in the international arena by its support for greater cooperation, sustainability, and inclusivity at the international level. Moreover, this paper’s notion of global responsibility is premised on the assumption that, as the paper will discuss in more detail later, Hong Kong has both the constitutionally and institutionally capacity and experience to play a more active role in these areas.

What are the arguments against utilizing the global realm to enhance local cohesion?

While many might be empathetic to the idea of Hong Kong participating in international efforts to make a better world for all, it may be difficult to see how a local community’s international policies can positively impact its levels of social cohesion. In fact, much of the literature on globalization’s impact on local communities describes the heavy social costs for those communities who uncritically subscribe to the mantra of global economic integration.¹² However, this paper does not deny that globalization can negatively impact local communities (in fact, it later argues that this reality makes it more necessary for local governments to be pro-active in contributing to the international policies which can help insure that globalization is more inclusive and sustainable), but this criticism of “globalization” is not really pertinent to our purported link between global responsibility and local social cohesion. In fact, the pertinent arguments against this linkage between globally responsible policies and local social cohesion can be roughly categorized into two camps.

The first camp argues that issues of globally responsibility don’t have enough salience among the Hong Kong people for these policies to make any meaningful difference to social cohesion. Conventional wisdom contends that international issues do not carry much weight in the eyes of the local community when they evaluate their leadership.¹³ Using this lens, the Hong Kong community would be more concerned with how their government performs on domestic issues of pressing concern, such as unemployment, social welfare or air pollution, when deciding how much trust to place in their leaders. While it could be said that perhaps there exists some small amount of interest in international policies which directly affect these immediate concerns, to argue that Hong Kong people place a high priority on the moral implications of Hong

¹² See, for example, Joseph E. Stiglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2002 or Dani Rodrik, “Trading in Illusions,” *Foreign Policy*, Mar/April 2002.

¹³ Walter Lippmann’s *Public Opinion* (1922) is one of the classic works from which the notion of the low salience of foreign policy issues to domestic publics is typically taken.

Kong's external affairs is simply taking it too far. Moreover, even if it could be claimed that Hong Kong people have some salient level of moral empathy for these issues, Hong Kong's potential role in actually making a difference on these issues is negligible. Hong Kong people recognize that and therefore would not give much credibility to an external affairs policy which emphasized Hong Kong's role on these issues.

While definitive responses to these criticism will have to wait until data collection and analysis on public opinion towards Hong Kong's external relations is completed,¹⁴ informal accounts of Hong Kong's global philanthropic activity on the private level¹⁵, coupled with existing survey data on popular newspaper readership focusing on international events¹⁶, together with legitimacy benefits that will be elaborated on later in this paper, lead us to believe that these assumptions of salience are not valid. Furthermore, the fact that people do care about international politics is supported by existing data from different countries:

“While only a minority can be regarded as politically active, large portions of the public seem regularly to follow news about foreign policy in the media. While domestic problems usually outweigh foreign and security issues in public salience, data reveal that substantial minorities consider foreign affairs among the most important problems facing their respective countries. On the average, 20-30% of the public [in US, Japan, Germany, France] indicate serious concern about foreign affairs.”¹⁷

With regard to Hong Kong's actions in this arena not having much credibility, in talking about globally responsible external policies, the paper is not suggesting that Hong Kong should propose to save the world or to make promises that Hong Kong is not capable or willing to keep. Rather Hong Kong should focus its energies on those areas where it has relevant experience such as in utilizing Hong Kong's weight in multilateral trade forums to encourage not only free trade, but fair trade or by capitalizing on Hong Kong's experience in grappling with the causes and consequences of SARS to promote more in depth regional cooperation on health and environmental issues.

These are not only important issues to the international community, but their high relevance to the Hong Kong domestic audience makes them highly salient in terms of local perception of regime legitimacy. In short, this paper argues that Hong Kong people would not only support a globally responsible agenda, but that this agenda has the potential to be a significant source of pride.

The second set of pertinent arguments against this paper's position can be said to stem from a belief in the danger of cosmopolitan aspirations or “global citizenship” to

¹⁴ The second part of this study will entail public survey work on Hong Kong's external relations.

¹⁵ Chong Chan-yau. “Global Poverty & Hong Kong's Response,” HKDF Newsletter, September 25, 2000, www.hkdf.org/newsletter

¹⁶ See Hong Kong Transition Project Survey (check citation???)

¹⁷ Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structures, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies,” *World Politics*, vol. 43, no 4 July 1991, p. 481.

social cohesion at the national and hence local level. In this view, to think of local, national and global political identities as potentially complementary, as this paper does, is incorrect. Loyalties to one layer of political community necessarily detract from allegiances to the other layers since political identity is by definition a zero sum proposition. More specifically, encouraging global moral obligation will weaken the obligations felt towards one's national community. For many, this would pose dangerous political risks because in today's world, nationalism is still viewed as crucial glue in bonding people together in order to overcome a wide variety of sectarian difference.

The idea of global citizenship has been frequently debated. In reviewing the development of the idea of global citizenship, Nigel Dower identified four main factors which have made the idea more attractive in recent years: (1) the increasing pressure of global problems requiring common solutions; (2) the general phenomenon of globalization; (3) a revived interest in the idea of citizenship itself; and (3) a revived interest in the perennial approach of cosmopolitanism or global ethics. The idea of global citizenship, however, is still highly problematic. Many question whether there is such a thing as a truly global ethic. Even if there is one, would "global citizenship" enhance or detract from our ability to meet these ethical obligations? Others ask what global institutions are necessary in order to talk about global citizenship. Still others question why we would talk about citizenship when the existing order has not served the world well.¹⁸

In other words, critics of global citizenship would argue that while a nascent consensus exists on common values and critical areas of global governance at the international level, we are far from becoming a proper global community. As such, it is a farce to talk of global citizenship since there is no overarching institutional framework to absorb such members. Effective social morality must come from the communities in which we are anchored. To strengthen the values that foster social cohesion we have to work within a real community setting, one with an established track record of bringing individuals together. To imagine that the global community is such a setting is at best wishful thinking and at worse a threat to cohesion at the national level.

In response to these concerns, this paper is not suggesting that the promotion of global citizenship in HK is a necessary precursor to a more globally responsible external agenda. The paper acknowledges that Hong Kong has a particularly difficult task in promoting allegiances to the local community that don't come at the expense of its national ties. Yet, the paper also argues that the difficulty of this social cohesion balancing act in Hong Kong is made easier by extending Hong Kong's radius of responsibility to the global level since a globally responsible external agenda concurrently emphasizes Hong Kong's uniqueness while supporting China's national aspirations.

¹⁸ See the discussion in the introductory chapter of Nigel Dower, *An Introduction to Global Citizenship* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), p.3-16

Hong Kong is an inseparable part of China and in the area of foreign policy, China must have but one voice. Under President Hu Jintao, China is already positioning itself as a leader in the effort 'to building a new just and reasonable eco-political order.'¹⁹ At the WTO Ministerial meetings in Cancun Mexico, for example, "Beijing joined about 20 other developing countries - together representing more than half the world's population - in tabling a resolution on agriculture, calling on developed countries to substantially reduce agricultural subsidies, which amount to over US\$300 billion a year."²⁰ Thus, Hong Kong's efforts on "fair trade" and other globally pressing issues would act to support China's critical positioning on these issues. Hong Kong's autonomy in external affairs, granted under the Basic Law framework, means that Hong Kong is in a unique position to strengthen its ties with the mainland while fulfilling its global moral obligations through proactively positioning itself on issues of global responsibility. The values, which support extending Hong Kong's radius of responsibility out to the global community, are the same values that will help hold China together.²¹

In addition, recognizing that as human beings we have moral obligation to aid the most vulnerable of our fellow global inhabitants to the best of our ability is not the same as calling for world government. This paper will go on to argue why a globally responsible agenda is important to Hong Kong for both material and non-material reasons. This belief does not require one to support a radical cosmopolitan agenda for the world. It does, however, recognize that Hong Kong would be well served to acknowledge that it is operating in an age where people possess multiple and contingent political identities. Focusing on global responsibility may not only help support the national efforts towards the same goals, but it will help cement Hong Kong's ties with the international community thereby helping to act as a hedge against the exclusive and ethnocentric tendencies that can be so destructive in purely nationalists constructions.

Social Cohesion Can be Enhanced Through Extending Hong Kong's Radius of Global Responsibility

With these criticisms addressed, we must now turn to the question of how to understand the links between external policies and social cohesion. The remainder of this paper will seek to show that by adopting a more pro-active and visible external policy agenda which focuses on Hong Kong's global responsibilities, Hong Kong can enhance local cohesion, by (1) increasing local pride in the uniqueness of what the Hong Kong community has to offer the nation and the world; by (2) strengthening the confidence of Hong Kong people in their leaders; and by (3) transferring lessons and experiences about how to enhance inclusivity and sustainability from the global level to the Hong Kong community. Thus a pro-active external agenda focusing on global responsibility will strengthen the bonds between Hong Kong people and the

¹⁹ Hu Jintao, "China And The World In The 21st Century," speech delivered by Visiting Chinese Vice President to the French International Relations Institute (FIRI) in Paris, November 5, 2001.

²⁰ Frank Ching, "Cancun and China's rising WTO Voice," The Business Times On-line, October 8, 2003 <<http://business-times.asia1.com.sg/sub/views/story/0,4574,96081,00.html>>

²¹ See the discussions in Martha Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," *Boston Review*, vol. 19, no. 5, 1994

government, and among the people themselves. Moreover, by accentuating Hong Kong's contribution to the nation and the world, this avenue of building local social cohesion will act as a hedge against the likelihood that cohesion in Hong Kong will come at the expense of cohesion at the national or global level.

1. A globally responsible external agenda fosters social cohesion by emphasizing what is unique about Hong Kong.

In politics, identity is established through difference. Hong Kong's collective identity needs to emphasize what is special about Hong Kong. Hong Kong people want a sense of community purpose that distinguishes Hong Kong from the rest of the country. With economic integration becoming a foregone conclusion, what avenues does Hong Kong have at its disposal to maintain Hong Kong's distinctiveness? The global realm is a vital staging ground to assert the legitimacy of Hong Kong's political identity because Hong Kong's international status has always been important part of its uniqueness.

Hong Kong has been granted a high degree of autonomy under the Basic Law in the area of external affairs. As a non-sovereign international actor, it has an unprecedented international presence. Beyond its high levels of economic integration with the global economy²², Hong Kong's strong international orientation is illustrated in its 50 bilateral agreements, its 200+ multilateral agreements (implemented by local legislation), its participation (in 2000) in more than 1300 international conferences (700 of these were limited to Governments and 60 of them were as part of PRC delegations), and the presence of 104 foreign consulate and 6 international organizations (IFC, IMF, UNHCR, Bank for International Settlements, EU, and the World Bank) which have offices here²³. Hong Kong is famous for its multicultural residential make-up and has a vibrant overseas diaspora which serves as an international conduit for the city and its residents. Last year, Hong Kong had over 14 million tourists visit. It has a sizeable presence of international media (close to 100 foreign media organizations have offices in HK) and well as international humanitarian, educational, and environmental NGOs. Taken together, this international autonomy and the richness of Hong Kong's international linkages distinguish it from other major cities in China. Hong Kong people are proud of this distinctiveness. A proactive globally responsible policy would help to enhance Hong Kong's special purpose in the eyes of its people making them more proud of their local communal affiliation.

Moreover, the "One Country, Two System" (OCTS) framework presupposes Hong Kong's existences as a separate political entity, different from other Chinese cities. Given the increasing economic and social integration between Hong Kong and the

²² According to the Hong Kong Trade and Development Council (on Jan 4, 2002), Hong Kong is the world's 9th largest trading economy, the world's 9th largest exporter of commercial services, and is China's largest source of foreign investment. Hong Kong has the world's 2nd highest per capita holding of foreign currency, the largest source of outward FDI in Asia, the world's busiest airport in terms of international cargo, the world's busiest container port, and the world's 9th largest stock market. (www.tdc.org.hk)

²³ As of 2000. The HKSAR's Constitutional Affairs Bureau and the Department of Justice publish updated lists of Hong Kong's treaty and international organization memberships.

Mainland, Hong Kong will have to continue to find ways to distinguish itself in order to remain worthy of the framework. While other Chinese cities will inevitably become increasingly integrated with the global economy, no other Chinese city will likely be able to directly participate in the international political decision making structures as Hong Kong can. Continuing to pro-actively and visibly participate in the global arena will help Hong Kong to maintain its distinctive international character. Moreover, by directing these efforts to support higher levels of international sustainability and inclusivity, Hong Kong will be seen as providing important support to China's nationalist aspirations, as mentioned previously. By focusing not only on what it can take from the international arena, but also on what it can give back, Hong Kong will further distinguish itself as a knowledgeable international player which wants to play a part in constructive solutions to the world's most pressing problems.

2. A globally responsible external agenda fosters social cohesion by increasing people's confidence in their government.

Normative Legitimacy

Emphasizing Hong Kong's ethical obligations beyond its borders will foster a stronger sense of pride in being a member of the HK community. Traditional Chinese political culture has always recognized that a strong sense of ethical consciousness among the populace is vital to effective rule. It also recognizes that political leaders have the responsibility to act as a community's moral standard bearer. People expect governments to set and operate within high moral standards for the community. Governments which do so operate from a base of principled authority which can serve as a legitimacy cushion if their material effectiveness declines.²⁴ HK people would support government actions to propagate global norms of cooperation.

Hong Kong has a moral obligation to act as a responsible global citizen. Hong Kong is a wealthy society and can afford to provide humanitarian aid to those who are in dire need. Hong Kong has also been a major beneficiary of global integration and the economic and political stability which multilateral organizations, transnational regimes, and people all over working together have helped to construct. Now that Hong Kong is one of the world's richest community's, it should work to expand the numbers of people which also seek to benefit from the same trends. Moreover, if Hong Kong wants the mantle of Asia's World City, than it should work to insure that the world is a better place for the next generation by address issues of sustainability. In doing so, Hong Kong can play a crucial role in acting as a testing ground for China leadership in increasing sustainability and inclusivity around the world. Hong Kong should not shy away from the crucial international role Hong Kong could play in supporting China's increasingly important rise as a globally responsible leader.

No one expects the Hong Kong government to be perfect. Moreover, people generally recognize that today's governments have a particularly difficult time

²⁴ Many of these arguments are elaborated on in L.M. Cummings' "PRC Foreign Policy Responsiveness to Domestic Ethical Sentiment: Understanding the Link between Ethics and Regime Legitimacy," unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2001.

managing not only their own populations, but in coping with the myriad challenges that stem from the need to make domestic populations less vulnerable to transnational problems. In doing so, governments will undoubtedly make many mistakes. Communities understand this. What threatens the bonds between people and their government and hence social cohesion is when these mistakes happen in an environment where the government already lacks principled authority. When Hong Kong people believe in what Hong Kong stands for and have faith that their leaders are striving to further these ends, then they will forgive much more, than when this is not the case.

Performance Legitimacy

Of course, the reverse of this legitimacy equation is true as well. Possessing a principled basis of authority does not relieve the Hong Kong government from its need to govern effectively. An active global strategy provides a vital staging ground to demonstrate the Hong Kong government's competent leadership because the Hong Kong community (like communities around the world) needs to see that "globalization" has not stripped its own government of its ability to protect Hong Kong citizens from the brutality of international political, financial, & health contagions. While national governments typically command higher degrees of authority in regulating against the excesses of globalization, people are recognizing that local governments have vital contributions to make in making people less vulnerable to the harshness of globalization. For Hong Kong in particular, people need to be convinced that their local leaders are making a difference in their lives in order to continue to support the OCTS framework.

Hong Kong is arguably the most globalized city in the world and as such the debates surrounding the future of globalization are very real to its people. While Hong Kong has largely benefited from its high degree of internationalization, one could also argue that increasing numbers of Hong Kong people are not benefiting directly from the city's global integration.²⁵ Even among those who count themselves as beneficiaries, the direct impact of the Asian financial crisis and SARS has left no doubt among Hong Kong people of their vulnerability to exogenous shocks. The Hong Kong government has to demonstrate its continued legitimacy and far-sightedness by developing a pro-active external agenda which is persuasive not only of Hong Kong's ability to effectively compete in the international arena, but also to effectively cooperate. This will have the effect of increasing the confidence of Hong Kong people in their government's ability to protect them against the negative forces of globalization and to enhance the impact of the positive forces of globalization.

More and more people in Hong Kong are attributing the popular malaise towards its leaders to flaws in Hong Kong's political structure. While this paper doesn't intend to engage in these debates, it does believe that in this transitional stage of Hong Kong's political existence, where reasonable disagreements exist about the type of governing structures that are best for Hong Kong, Hong Kong's international participation has the potential to be an important legitimizing factor for the Hong Kong government.

²⁵ See for example Peter Kwong & Dusanka Miscecvic, "Globalization and Hong Kong's Future," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, vol. 32, No. 3, 2002.

International evaluations of Hong Kong's performance (including international organization or treaty body reports, bilateral reviews, or international NGO studies) are crucial resources, not only internationally, but domestically for people to gage the Hong Kong government's effectiveness in a wide variety of areas.²⁶ By engaging more actively with international actors on issues of global responsibility, the Hong Kong government could widen its positive international exposure on these issues, which will reverberate down to the local community.

3. A globally responsible external agenda fosters social cohesion by providing a model for local sustainability and inclusivity.

A globally responsible external agenda will not only strengthen the bonds between Hong Kong people and its government, but it will also strengthen the bonds among Hong Kong people themselves. First of all, communities who take responsibility for solving problems at the global level gain the knowledge and experience to better solve problems at home²⁷. From a macro perspective, adopting a global ethic of responsibility forces one to see "problems of the periphery as moral obligations to address" and therefore, local communities who engage at this level will be less likely to ignore their own community's peripheries.²⁸ From a micro perspective, when local stakeholders participate in global problem solving, they have access to a global body of knowledge, technologies and management skills from which to draw to solve local problems. Local stakeholders who are on the periphery of their societies, threatened with exclusion, can also utilize transnational networks and lobbying structures to further their own agenda at home.

An external agenda which extends Hong Kong's radius of responsibility to the international level will have the added benefit of helping to shape a collective identity which appeals to multiple levels of Hong Kong's society, from those "cosmopolitans" (who have multiple passports or visas which allow them to move freely around the globe) to those "heartlanders" (whose livelihood and orientation are local). Hong Kong could learn from Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong when he described the need to forge a bond between these different groups in Singapore in his 1999 National Day Address.

"As Singapore becomes more international, two broad categories of people will emerge. One group I call the "cosmopolitans" because their outlook is international...they can work and be comfortable anywhere in the world. The

²⁶ See for example the "United States Hong Kong Policy Act Report," (as of April 1, 2003, as required by Section 301 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. 5731 as amended) <<http://www.usconsulate.org.hk/ushk/pi/2003/040101.htm>>, or the "Six Monthly Report on Hong Kong," (January -June 2003, Presented to the Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, July 2003) or the HK Human Rights Commission, UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, "On the First Periodic Report in Respect of HKSAR of the PRC under Articles 2-16 of the ICESCR," January 2001 <www.locoa.net/news/reports/hong-human1.htm>

²⁷ Social scientists might describe this reality as international involvement's impact on the "domestic distribution of power among social groups" (Alastair Iain Johnston, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments," *International Studies Quarterly*, 2001, 45, p. 487

²⁸ Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism."

other group, the “heartlanders”, makes their living within the country...their orientation and interests are local rather than international.

Both heartlanders and cosmopolitans are important to Singapore’s well being. Heartlanders play a major role in maintaining our core values and our social stability. They are the core of our society. Without them, there will be no safe and stable Singapore, no Singapore system, no Singapore brand name. Cosmopolitans, on the other hand, are indispensable in generating wealth for Singapore. They extend our economic reach. The world is their market. Without them, Singapore can not run as an efficient, high performance society.

The challenge for us is to get the heartlanders to understand what the cosmopolitans contribute to Singapore’s and their own well being, and to get the cosmopolitans to feel an obligation and sense of duty to the heartlanders. If cosmopolitans and heartlanders cease to identify with each other, our society will fall apart.”²⁹

Not only will focusing on global concerns instinctively appeal to the international orientation of Hong Kong “cosmopolitans”, but an external agenda that focuses on sustainability and inclusivity will appeal to those “heartlanders” in the Hong Kong community who feel left behind by the fast changing international arena. Hong Kong’s involvement in constructing a solution at the global level will signal to these people that the government understands that not everyone is thriving as a result of global integration and that Hong Kong is not only striving to be part of the global solutions but is trying to share the lessons learned around the world with those in need in Hong Kong.

It should also appeal to the younger generation among the Hong Kong community. If values trends in Hong Kong mimic those from around the world (as seen in the World Values Survey data), “after a long period of rising economic and physical security, one should find substantial differences between value priorities of older and younger groups.”³⁰ In economically developed communities like Hong Kong, researchers are seeing that older generations tend to have more materialists values, “giving top priority to economic and physical security”, while younger generations tend to adopt “post-materialists” values “with goals such as freedom, self-expression and quality of life.”³¹ Presumably, a Hong Kong collective identity that is shaped by its commitment to global sustainability would hold more appeal to this post-materialist generation, helping to keep them motivated and involved in making Hong Kong a better place for all.

²⁹ Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s National Day Rally Speech, 1999. Singapore Government Press Release. November 4, 2003 <<http://app10.internet.gov.sg/data/sprinter/pr/1999082202.htm>>.

³⁰ Inglehart, Ronald. “Globalization and Post-Modern Values.” *The Washington Quarterly*. 23:1, pp 215-228, 1999.

³¹ *Ibid.*

HKSARG efforts to promote global responsibility in the international arena will help social cohesion at home by providing a model of “responsible citizenship” for the local community. Social scientists have long noted that “cooperative norms [can] arise as a result of repeated community interaction.”³² When Hong Kong people see the benefits generated for Hong Kong as a result of actions conducive to good global citizenship, they, presumably would be more likely to adapt the same standards at home. Conversely, how persuasive can a government be in calling on its own members to sacrifice for the good of the community, when the government itself is not willing to make any sacrifices for the good of the human community.

Conclusions & Next Steps

This paper has attempted to demonstrate why a pro-active external agenda focusing on global responsibility will strengthen social cohesion in Hong Kong by (1) increasing local pride in the uniqueness of what the Hong Kong community has to offer the nation and the world; by (2) strengthening the confidence of Hong Kong people in their leaders; and by (3) transferring lessons and experiences about how to enhance inclusivity and sustainability from the global level to the Hong Kong community. In addition, it has also argued that by accentuating Hong Kong’s contribution to the nation and the world, this avenue of building local social cohesion will act as a hedge against the likelihood that cohesion in Hong Kong will come at the expense of cohesion at the national or global level.

So assuming one is sympathetic with the above hypothesis, then the next step is to try and determine whether or not it is accurate. The next stage of this research project will endeavor to test these hypotheses by performing public surveys to see whether Hong Kong people perceive a more globally active Hong Kong as a Hong Kong more worthy of their belonging and commitment. It will also seek to buttress its arguments by finding comparative international examples of how globally responsible foreign policies have enhanced local social cohesion. We, of course, would appreciate and welcome comments or criticism on the hypothesis as set forth and would value any suggestion on how to proceed to the next round.

³² Fukuyama, “Social Capital, Civil Society and Development.” p. 16.

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The Need for Social Cohesion at Multiple Political Layers

